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I. INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions' increasingly are requiring consumers 2 to arbitrate
disputes rather than resort to litigation. They have done so at a time when
arbitration is exceedingly popular as a means of ameliorating the excessive
costs and delays of litigation. Arbitration programs were initially intended
to avoid class action lender liability suits demanding punitive damages.
However, the emergence of consumer challenges provides opportunities to
further examine the issues raised by consumer arbitration and to question
the appropriateness of such arbitration.
This Article examines in detail several of the arbitration contracts
currently in use. Several findings emerge from this review. For example,
the contracts typically cover far more than potential lender liability claims.
Indeed, some contracts purport to include disputes of any kind regardless of
when they arise. The Article then reviews the state and federal arbitration
statutes and case law governing arbitration contracts, and the attacks which
consumers can make to challenge their validity. The Article next questions
this type of arbitration as a matter of public policy. Finally, the Article
discusses legislative approaches to safeguard consumer interests and
recommends a course of action for lawmakers.
II. THE MOTIVATING FACTOR:

LENDER LIABILITY

Bankers have stated that the major factor triggering the move to
arbitration of bank/consumer disputes is the fear of exposure to lender
liability lawsuits. 3 In order to understand this fear and evaluate whether
arbitration is the appropriate response, it is necessary to review briefly the

1 Although banks have played a leading role in promoting arbitration to resolve disputes
with consumers, other financial institutions, such as finance companies and mortgage
companies, also have used arbitration agreements in consumer transactions. See, e.g., Bell v.
Congress Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1994) (mortgage company);
McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122 (N.D. Cal.
July 18, 1994) (mortgage company); Patterson v. lIT, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App. 1993),

cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1217 (1994) (finance company). "Financial institution" is used in the
article to refer both to banks and other financial services companies extending credit to
consumers.
2A survey conducted by American Banker found that in 1992, total bank loans to
consumers amounted to $849.3 billion. Stephen Kleege, Card Loans Fell Last Year for First
7ie Since 1981, AM. BANKER, Aug. 27, 1993, at 25A.
3 Lloyd N. Shields, The Role of Mandatory Arbitrationfor FinancialInstitutions, ARE.
J., Dec. 1991, at 49.
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phenomenon known as "lender liability." This section will describe leading
types of lender liability cases, the theories underlying these cases, and the
trends in recent decisions. 4 The section then will examine the impact of
arbitration on this case law.
Financial institutions are perhaps most concerned with courts finding
lenders in a fiduciary relationship with their borrowers. 5 This concern arises
from the plethora of duties which result when such a relationship is
present.6 There are three sources of fiduciary relationships. The duty arises
when the parties are in certain special relationships such as principal-agent,
attorney-client, and guardian-ward. 7 A second source is when a person

entrusts another with money or property. An example occurs when a person
puts money into a bank account. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
imposed fiduciary responsibilities upon a bank when it used money in one
of its customer's account to pay another person's obligations. 8 A third
source is when a person reposes trust and confidence in another. Generally,
courts impose fiduciary duties only when the parties do not have equal
bargaining power, the weaker party relies on the stronger party, and the
stronger party takes financial advantage of the other. 9 Courts refuse to find
a fiduciary relationship on this basis, however, unless there is proof that
both parties understand that the weaker party reposed trust or confidence in
the other party and the parties reasonably expected the stronger party to act
solely or primarily on behalf of the weaker party. 10 Lenders have been held
liable for breach of a fiduciary duty when they have provided advice to
customers under circumstances where the court has found a reposing of trust
or confidence. 1
A case such as Jacques v. FirstNationalBank, 12 illustrates the type of
4 Treatises include within the rubric of lender liability" a wide variety of suits brought
against lenders. For example, one lender liability treatise includes leveraged buyouts,

environmental cleanups, and securities law violations as well as common law causes of action.
MARK E. BuDNrrz, Tim LAW OF LENDER LiABILrr=, chs. 5, 8, 9, 10 (rev. ed. 1994). See
GERALD BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILTY (1989). This section will discuss those theories
which are most likely to be the basis of lender liability litigation brought by consumers against

banks.
5 Shields, supra note 3, at 49.

6 BUDNrrz, supra note 4, § 5-24.
7 Mark E. Budnitz, The Sale of Credit Life Insurance: The Bank as Fiduciary,62 N.C.
L. Rnv. 295, 301 (1984).
8 Lash v. Cheshire County Say. Bank, Inc., 474 A.2d 980, 981-82 (N.H. 1984).

9 Budnitz, supra note 7, at 300.
10 Id.

11 BuDN=iz, supra note 4, §§ 5-28 to 5-34.
12 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986) (discussed in BUDNITZ, supra note 4, §§ 5-17).
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situation which concerns bankers. In Jacques, the bank breached its
fiduciary duty when it failed to accurately calculate the amount of a
mortgage loan for which the borrowers could qualify. Similarly, in
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United CaliforniaBank, 13 a $100,000 punitive
damages award was upheld for the consumer. The bank had paid $4,000 to
a thief who cashed the customer's forged checks and then refused to recredit
the customer's account because the customer did not notify the bank of the
forgery within the time required by the Uniform Commercial Code. 14
The doctrine of good faith is also of concern to bankers. The doctrine is
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts15 and the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC). 16 It is applied to lenders having discretion over
certain aspects of a transaction, lenders accelerating payment of a loan, and
lenders failing to follow their own policies and procedures. 17 In KMC Co.
v. Irving Trust Co., 18 the borrower obtained a secured line of credit to
finance its wholesale grocery business. According to the terms, the bank
would loan the company up to $3.5 million "in its discretion." When the
borrower requested an $800,000 advance to cover checks that would be
presented for payment immediately, the bank refused to extend the
requested credit and did not resume financing for three days. As a result,
the checks bounced. The borrower eventually liquidated its businesses
because of the damage to its reputation caused by the bank's refusal. 19
Under these circumstances, including a request for a fully collateralized
extension of credit and the absence of valid business reasons for terminating
the line of credit, the court held that the bank violated its good faith
obligation. Although the loan documents gave the bank the authority to loan
money "in its discretion," the court held the bank was required to notify the
borrower in advance of its intention to deny further credit, in order to
provide the borrower the opportunity to seek alternative financing. 20
Other causes of action in lender liability cases include
unconscionability,2 1 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 22 fraud, 23 and duress. 24 Courts have awarded treble damages for
13 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1985).
14
The California Court of Appeals later recanted its Commercial Cotton decision in
Copesky v. SuperiorCourt, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1991).
15

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 205 (1981).

16 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
17 BUDNrrz, supra note 4, §§ 4-17 to 4-32.
18 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
'9 Id. at 754.
20 Id. at 759.

21 Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (Ct. App. 1991).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq. (1988); BUDNrrZ, supra note 4, §§ 6-1 to 6-73.
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RICO violations 25 and punitive damages for acting in bad faith. 26
Banks also have faced class action lender liability suits on grounds
specifically related to consumer credit issues. 27 For example, in Perdue v.
Crocker National Bank,28 the California Supreme Court held that a
consumer stated a cause of action when he alleged that the amount the bank
charged for insufficiently funded accounts was unconscionable. More
recently, in Beasley v. Wells FargoBank,29 a $5.2 million jury award was
upheld on appeal in a case alleging violation of a California statute
regulating excessive late and overlimit fees. In a third California case, Leary
v. Wells Fargo Bank,30 consumers sued three banks for violating state
antitrust laws by conspiring to fix interest31rates on credit cards. Two of the
banks settled for many millions of dollars.
Financial institutions have turned to arbitration not only to avoid the
huge monetary awards to which they may be subject, 32 but also to escape
the publicity which accompanies litigation. Publicity has two deleterious
consequences for a financial institution. First, it may substantially tarnish
the institution's public image. 33 Second, it may encourage consumers to sue
the institution. 34 In contrast, arbitration is private. 35 Arbitration has other
benefits as well. The lengthy and expensive discovery that financial
institutions encounter in lender liability suits is largely eliminated in
23

BUDNrrz, supra note 4, §§ 5-30 to 5-48.

24 Id. §§ 5-48 to 5-52.
25 BuDNrrZ, supra note 4, §§ 11-18 to 11-19.
26Id. §§ 11-17 to 11-18.
27
See Dwight Golann, Consumer Financial Services Litigation: Major Judgments and

ADR Responses, 48 Bus. LAw. 1141 (1993).
28 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985). See Weyman I. Lundquist, Alternative Dispute Resolution
as a Settlement Strategy in the Wake ofPerdue v. Crocker National Bank, 43 Bus. LAw. 1095

(1988).
29 1 Cal Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1991). in a companion case, the court affirmed a
judgment awarding attorney fees, costs, and expenses. Id. at 459.
30
No. 866229 (San Francisco City Sup. filed Oct. 28, 1986) (discussed in Golann,
supra note 27, at 1142).
31 Golann, supra note 27, at 1143.

32 Id. at 1141; see also Shields, supra note 3, at 49; Michael B. Cahill, Why Financial
Institutions Are Resolving Disputes Out of Court - A Banker's Perspective (Sept. 1992) (on

file with the Ohio State Journalon DisputeResolution).
33 Shields, supra note 3, at 50. See also Joseph McLaughlin, Resolving Disputes in the
FinancialCommunity: Alternatives to Litigation, ARB. J., Sept. 1986, at 16, 19 (litigation may

damage the bank's reputation with its customers).
34 Shields, supra note 3, at 50.
35 id.
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arbitration where discovery is severely restricted. 36 Arbitration is faster and
less costly than litigation. 37 Arbitrators are not required to issue written
opinions explaining their decision. 38 Therefore, financial institutions39need
not fear that an unfavorable decision, such as those discussed above, will
encourage others to sue on the same grounds or provide precedent which
subsequent arbitrators or judges will feel compelled to follow.

mI1.

THE SOLUTION: ARBITRATION

Bankers have announced that they are turning to arbitration as their
major strategy to prevent future losses in lender liability lawsuits. 40 An
examination of the arbitration contracts they have drafted, however,
demonstrates that these institutions have decided to use arbitration to take
care of a great deal more than merely that type of litigation. Instead, these
institutions have decided to enlist arbitration as the remedy, or at least an
alternative remedy, in almost every type of dispute with consumers. 4 1 This
section will analyze the arbitration contracts used by four financial
institutions with their customers. In addition, this section will analyze a
variety of selected arbitration clauses used by financial institutions, whether
in consumer or commercial transactions, in order to explore the variety of
options available to these institutions, and the problems they may pose if
required in consumer transactions. Finally, this section will analyze those
contracts in light of federal and state arbitration statutes in order to
understand the significance of the provisions drafted by the institutions.
36

Michael F. Hoellering & Peter Goetz, Piercing the Veil: Document Discovery in

ArbitrationHearings, ARE. J., Sept. 1992, at 59.
37

RODOLPHE J.A. DE SEIFE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: PRACTICE GUIDE,

§ 1:01 at 2, § 5:01 at 69 (1987). See also Cheryl Aptowitzer, Recent Case Note, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 998, 998 (1993).
38 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 8-18.
40 Shields, supra note 3, at 49.
41 An exception to this comprehensive coverage is contained in California arbitration
contracts. California banks typically provide that the arbitrator has no authority to enter a
judgment on any indebtedness secured by a deed of trust on real property. N. Sue Van Sant
Palmer, Comment, Lender Liability andArbitration:Preservingthe Fabricof Relationship, 42
VAND. L. REV. 947, 981-82 (1989). The objective of this exception is to avoid a state rule
which would otherwise limit the lender's remedies. Annotations to Proposed Arbitration
Clausefor FinancialInstitutions (n.d.), reproduced in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REDUCING THE COSTS OF LITIGATION 21 (Am. Arb. Assoc.
n.d.) [hereinafter ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS] (on file with the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution).
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A. ArbitrationProvisions Used by Four FinancialInstitutions
Several financial institutions have included arbitration contracts in their
consumer contracts in the past few years. These institutions include Bank of
California, 42 Bank of America, 43 Marathon Bank, 44 and Zions First
National Bank. 45 These financial institutions have taken a variety of

approaches to arbitration, illustrating the many choices available to them
and the different types of difficulties consumers may encounter.
For example, Marathon Bank 46 and the Bank of California4 7 impose
mandatory arbitration upon the consumer and the institution whenever there
is a dispute. 48 In contrast, the Bank of America4 9 and Zions5 ° require
arbitration only if either party requests it. There may not be any practical
difference in the two types of provisions. Presumably, if both of the parties
to a dispute subject to the contracts drafted by Marathon and Bank of
California agreed they did not want the dispute decided by arbitration, no
one would trigger the arbitration process and the dispute would51be decided
by some other formal or informal dispute resolution mechanism.
Bank of California,5 2 Marathon, 53 and Zions54 employ broad "dragnet"
clauses5 s which subject to arbitration not only disputes arising out of or
42 Palmer, supra note 41, at 950 n.21.
43 Id. at 950.

44 Shields, supra note 3, at 52.
45

Stephen A. Hochman, A Lawyers Arbitration Forum Is Needed for Commercial

Arbitration, Arbitrationfor the Business Lawyer: The Questions Your Clients Will Ask and the
Answers, presented to the Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Business Law Spring Meeting (April 7,

1994) (on file with the Ohio State Journalon Dispute Resolution).
46 J.F. Morrow & James R. Butler, Arbitration: Working in Banking, 1 AM. ARB. REP.

No. 2 (1990), reprintedin ADR FOR FINANCIAL INsTrrUMONS, supra note 41, at 57.
47 Palmer, supra note 41, at 982.
48

The one exception is disputes involving loans secured by real estate which are not
subject to arbitration. Id.
49

Id. at 981.
50 Hochman, supra note 45, at 45.

51 First Federal Savings of California has a mandatory arbitration provision for all
disputes, but its contract specifically provides that the parties can agree to resolve their dispute
otherwise, if they so agree in writing. ADR FOR FINANCIAL INsTITUTIONS, supra note 41, at
30.
52 Palmer, supra note 41, at 982.
53

Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 57.
54 Hochman, supra note 45, at 45.
55 Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 58.
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relating to the agreement the parties executed, but also to any other dispute
among the parties. Bank of America's contract confines the scope of
arbitration to disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement. One
reviewer of that contract noted that by limiting itself in this fashion, Bank
of America was allowing many types of disputes to escape arbitration. s 6 The
Marathon contract specifically states what may be implicit in the contracts
of Bank of California and Zions, namely, that the obligation to arbitrate
extends to any7 "past, present or future transactions, agreements or
5
relationships."
All four banks specify that the arbitration contract considers alleged
torts within its scope. 58 However, they have different ways of expressing
this. Bank of California's contract covers any "controversy or
59
claim ...including any claim based on or arising from an alleged tort."
6°
6t
Bank of America and Zions cover any controversy or claim "including
but not limited to ...an alleged tort." The Marathon contract covers "any
dispute... whether sounding in contract, tort, breach of duty, or
otherwise .... "62 The Marathon contract further implicitly covers
disputes such as lender liability, collection claims, slip and fall cases which
occur in the bank's parking lot, slander or libel, and "injuries using
63
ATMs... or whatever."

Despite the breadth of these scope provisions, the contracts carve out of
arbitration either party's right to foreclose on real or personal property,
exercise self-help, or maintain a court action for provisional or ancillary
remedies. 64 Such provisions may favor financial institutions. It is the lender
who would use the rights granted in the provision; consumers would rarely,
if ever, use them.
56 Examples of such disputes are: "fraud, constructive fraud, undue influence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and similar matters" which relate to the transaction, but arguably do not arise
out of the agreement. ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 41, at 21.
57
Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 57.
58 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981-82; Hochman, supra note 45, at 45; Morrow &
Butler, supra note 46, at 57.
59 Palmer, supra note 41, at 982.
60 Id. at 981.

61 Hochman, supra note 45, at 45.
62 Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 57.
63 Id. at 59.
64 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981-83; Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 57. The

Zions' contract confers the foreclosure right only upon the bank. Hochman, supra note 45, at
46. The contract drafted by the United States National Bank of Oregon lists examples of
provisional remedies: "injunction, appointment of receiver, attachment, claim and delivery,
and replevin." ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 41, at 73.
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Except for the Bank of America, the banks' contracts specify that the
arbitrations are to be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 65 In
contrast, the Bank of America's contract provides that arbitrations shall be
pursuant to California law. 66 Bank of America apparently believes
California's arbitration law is more favorable than the FAA. 67 Conversely,
of "conflicting state
one reason Marathon prefers the FAA is its preemption
68
law theories such as 'contracts of adhesion.'
All four financial institutions state in their contracts that disputes are to
be decided pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA). 69 Bank of California 70 and Zions7 1 incorporate the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the AAA. Marathon incorporates both those rules, as
well as the Supplemental Procedures for Financial Institution Disputes. 72
The four banks provide for the selection of arbitrators according to the
methods employed by the AAA. There are differences, however, in their
approaches. The contracts used by Bank of California 73 and Zions 74 are
silent on selection of arbitrators, but contain general provisions which
incorporate the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. Consequently, those
rules govern selection. 75 Bank of America's contract provides that selection
65 Palmer, supra note 41, at 982; Hochman, supra note 45, at 46; Morrow & Butler,
supra note 46, at 57. The FAA is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
66 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981.
67

See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1288.8 (1982 & Supp. 1995). The authors of a
model arbitration clause for use in Colorado recommend application of Colorado law rather
than the FAA because Colorado statutes do not allow the arbitrator to award penal damages. A
Model Arbitration Clausefor Commercial Loan Agreements: A Report of the ADR Industy
Focus Subcommittee, 20 COLO. LAW. 1159, 1161 n.1 (1991) [hereinafter Colorado Model].
68 Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 59.
69 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981-82; Hochman, supra note 45, at 45; Morrow & Butler,
supra note 46, at 57.
70 Palmer, supra note 41, at 982.
71 Hochman, supra note 45, at 45.
72
Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 57.
73 Palmer, supra note 41, at 983.
74 Hochman, supra note 45, at 45-46.
75
The AAA maintains a National Panel of Commercial Arbitrators from which it
compiles lists to submit to parties. ROBERT COULSON, BusiNEss ARBITRATION, WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW 34 (4th ed. 1991). The parties have ten days to cross off the names of
persons they object to and number the remainder in order of preference. The AAA then
selects the arbitrator preferred by the parties. If the parties fail to agree on any of the persons
on the list, the AAA makes the appointment. The AAA appoints one arbitrator if the parties'
agreement is silent on this matter. The AAA, however, has authority to appoint a greater
number. ld. at 37.
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is to be made in the same manner as the AAA uses in its proceedings, but
there is no reference to the Commercial Arbitration Rules. 76 Marathon
directs the parties to follow the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA
and the Supplemental Procedures for Financial Institution Disputes. 77 But,
in a significant departure from the other banks, its contract also provides
that either party may require that arbitrators be retired judges. 7 8 Selection of
a retired judge substantially increases the cost of arbitration by $200 to
$300 per hour. 79 The provision has been justified in three ways. First, the
prevailing party may be able to recover its arbitration costs - including the
arbitrator's fee. 80 Second, the provision ensures "important protection on
the quality of the decision maker." 81 Third, the clause provides an incentive
for the parties to be "reasonable" in their approach to resolving the
dispute.

82

Only the Zions contract specifically provides for the location of the
arbitration hearings. That contract specifies that all proceedings will be held
in Salt Lake City, Utah. 8 3 Because the other contracts are silent, the
location of hearings held in disputes involving the other banks are
determined in accordance with the AAA rules. These rules provide that the
parties may agree on the locale for the hearing.84 Alternatively, one party
may request a specific locale; the opposing party has ten days to object. If
that party does object, the arbitrator has authority to decide on the locale.
All four contracts use traditional "legalese," much of which
presumably would be incomprehensible to most consumers. Examples
include:

"setoff ...

provisional

or ancillary remedies... receiver."85

Probably more crucial is the omission in the contracts used by three of the
banks of an explanation of the arbitration contract's significance and what
rights the consumer is surrendering. In stark contrast, the Zions contract
includes "plain English" disclosures. The first disclosure states that
arbitration is "usually final and binding and subject to only very limited
review by a court."86 There is no explanation of what final and binding
76 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981.
77 Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 57.
78 id.
79

1d. at 59.
80 id.
81 Id.
82 Morrow & Butler, supra note 46, at 59.

83 Hoclman, supra note 45, at 45.
84AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES §

(1984); COULSON, supra note 75, at 35.
85 Palmer, supra note 41, at 983 (Bank of California).
86 Hochman, supra note 45, at 45.
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arbitration means, and the contract does not discuss the circumstances under
which a court may review an arbitrator's order. The next disclosure,
however, goes a long way towards remedying the obscurity of the first
disclosure by explaining that the parties are waiving their rights to litigate
the dispute in court, and that this includes waiver of their rights to a jury
trial. Next, the Zions contract warns that discovery in arbitration is more
limited and different than in court proceedings. There is no explanation of
what "discovery" includes. The fourth disclosure informs the parties that
the arbitrator is not required to issue an opinion containing findings of fact
or "legal reasoning." In addition, this disclosure again cautions that the
right to appeal the arbitrator's award is limited, but does not explain in what
way it is limited. Finally, the contract tells the parties that one of the
arbitrators may be affiliated with the banking industry. Zions also provides
a brochure which goes
into greater detail to explain in "plain English" what
87
arbitration entails.
B. Other Types of ArbitrationProvisions
An examination of clauses in other arbitration contracts indicates
further options. These contracts include a "proposed" contract, 88 a "model"
contract, 89 and contracts that financial institutions may use only in
commercial transactions. They demonstrate ways in which institutions may
clarify ambiguities, further restrict remedies, and increase barriers to
consumer redress.
Examples of provisions which fill in gaps or clarify matters include:
specifying that statutes of limitations which would be applicable in a
judicial proceeding apply in arbitration as well, 90 and providing that if there
is an inconsistency between the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and the
institution's contract, the contract supersedes the rules. 91
A paragraph in the arbitration contract used by First Federal Savings
Bank of California allows pre-hearing motions. 92 The arbitrator is
authorized to decide motions to dismiss and motions for summary
adjudication. It is within the arbitrator's discretion whether to conduct a
hearing or decide based solely on document submissions. This provision is
designed to deal with an anomaly of arbitration proceedings. Consistent
87

ZIONs FIST NAT'L BANK, ARBITRATION IN LENDING (1991) (on file with the Ohio

State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
88 See ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 41, at 18.

89 Colorado Model, supra note 67, at 1160-61.
90 See ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 41, at 18.
91 Id.

92 See id.

277

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTERESOLUTION

[Vol. 10:2 1995]

with its objective of eliminating endless pre-trial maneuvering and ensuring
a prompt hearing on the merits, arbitration generally eliminates pre-trial
motion practice. 93 Ironically, in some cases, this actually prevents
expeditious resolution of the dispute, because it requires a full arbitration
hearing of the entire case, even in those instances where the case could be
disposed of on procedural or jurisdictional grounds without any need for a
full-blown hearing.
Some contracts are quite specific in regard to the arbitrators. A
proposed contract for financial institutions provides that arbitrators must be
"knowledgeable in the subject matter of the Dispute. "94 If retired judges are
used, they can be selected through AAA panels, those maintained by the
state courts, or even panels established by private organizations. If the
arbitrator is an attorney, he or she is limited to awarding no more than
$100,000. If the claim is greater, a retired judge must be the arbitrator
unless the complainant seeks more than one million dollars. In the latter
case, a panel of three arbitrators is required, at least one of whom must be a
retired judge.
95
Many contracts contain no explicit provision governing venue.
Consequently, in contracts subject to AAA rules, venue is governed by
those rules. Under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, in the absence
of a provision in the contract and agreement by both parties, the
administrator decides the appropriate venue. 96 Patterson v. 17T Consumer
Financial Corp.97 illustrates the perils of drafting an arbitration contract

which contains a venue clause. In Patterson, ITT used a contract which
stated that any dispute would be subject to the rules of the National
Arbitration Forum and resolved "by the National Arbitration Forum,
Minneapolis, Minnesota ....
"98 The court found that this provision
suggests that Minnesota would be the location of any arbitration. 99 The
court further concluded that the arbitration contract was an unenforceable
contract of adhesion. While contracts of adhesion are not necessarily
objectionable, they become so if they contain provisions which are beyond
the reasonable expectations of the weaker party. The court held that it was
not within the reasonable expectation of California borrowers that they

93 Shields, supra note 3, at 51.
94 See ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 41, at 19.
95 E.g., Palmer, supra note 41, at 982-83 (Bank of California); id.at 981-82 (Bank of
America).
96 COULSON, supra note 75, at 35.
97 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1217 (1994).
98
Id. at 566.
99 Id., 18 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
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would be subject to arbitration in Minnesota.1 0
The Colorado Model Arbitration Contract includes an optional
provision which combines mediation and arbitration. 10 1 The provision
requires the parties to initially submit their dispute for mediation conducted
pursuant to the AAA Commercial Mediation Rules. The contract contains a
time limit for the mediation. If, after a set period of time, the parties have
not reached a settlement, either party can force the dispute to arbitration.
Mediation has the advantage of permitting a solution which may not be
permitted by the contract or law if the dispute goes to arbitration. 102 In
addition, because it is less adversarial, there is a greater possibility that the
parties will emerge with their working relationship intact."0 3
The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide for a single arbitrator
to hear cases with discretion to appoint a greater number.104 First Federal
Savings Bank of California's contract provides that a "Qualified
Attorney' 05 may hear cases where the amount in controversy is less than
$100,000.106 Disputes in which the amount is between $100,001 and
$1,000,001 must be decided by a "Qualified Judge."' 0 7 Cases where the
amount in controversy is over one million dollars must be decided by a
panel consisting of a Qualified Judge, a Qualified Attorney, and a Qualified
08
Business Person.1
The Colorado Model Arbitration Contract requires a panel of three
arbitrators, one from each of three groups: (1) a lawyer who has practiced
commercial law for a set number of years or a retired judge; (2) a person
with at least a set number of years of experience in commercial lending; and
(3) a person with at least a set number of years of experience in a relevant
industry. 10 9 The model contract provides for disputes under a given amount
to be decided by a single arbitrator and under expedited procedures.
Many arbitration contracts used by financial institutions are silent as to
100 Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66.

101 Colorado Model, supra note 67, at 1160.
102 rd.
103 Id. at 1162 n.8.
104 COULSON, supra note 75, at 37.
105 "Qualified Attorney" is defined as a person who has been a member in good

standing of the California Bar for the preceding five years who is familiar with the subject
matter of the dispute. ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTrTUIONS, supra note 41, at 32.
106 Id.

107 "Qualified Judge" is defined as any retired judge of certain California courts or any
federal court with panels located in California. Id. at 32.
108 "Qualified Business Person" is defined as a person familiar with the subject matter
of the dispute. Id.
109 Colorado Model, supra note 67, at 1160.
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who pays which costs." 0 Because they are silent, this issue would be
decided according to the rules of the AAA and case law under the FAA or
Uniform Arbitration Act."' In contrast, the proposed arbitration contract
for financial institutions is very specific on this point. It provides that each
party must pay all of its own expenses and an equal share of the arbitrator's
fees. The arbitrator, however, has the power to award the arbitrator's fees,
as well as attorney's fees and administrative fees, to the prevailing party.
Setting out the provision on fees in the contract instead of silently
incorporating the AAA rules has three advantages. First, it eliminates this
issue from being subject to changes in AAA rules. Second, it eliminates the
issue of which AAA rules apply - rules in force at the time of execution of
the contract or those in force at the time of the dispute. Third, it alerts the
consumers to the fee issue, which otherwise may not occur to them, and
provides them with this crucial information. Otherwise, consumers have no
way to know how costs will be allocated unless they obtain copies of the
applicable rules. This in itself may be impossible. Whereas some banks
specify that the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA apply, 112 the
3
Bank of America's contract simply provides that the AAA applies.11
Consequently, the consumer would not even know what set of rules to
request.
The Colorado Model Arbitration Contract provides three alternative
approaches to the allocation of costs and fees.' 14 One alternative requires
the arbitrator to award all costs and fees to the prevailing party. 115 A second
option is for the contract to provide that each party shall bear its own costs
and expenses, and that the arbitrators' fees and administrative fees be
divided equally." 6 A third choice is to allocate the costs as provided for in
the provisions of the loan agreement or other documents which relate
110 E.g., Palmer, supra note 41, at 982-83 (Bank of California); id. at 981-82 (Bank of
America).
iii

The AAA maintains a schedule of the administrative fee which both must pay.

COULSON, supra note 75, at 40-41. The arbitrator may apportion this fee in his or her award.
In the case of extreme hardship, the AAA may reduce or defer the fee. Parties must pay the
expenses of their own witnesses. All other expenses are paid equally by the parties unless the
parties otherwise agree or the arbitrator apportions the fee otherwise in his or her award.

112 E.g., Hochman, supra note 45, at 45.
113 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981.
114 ColoradoModel, supra note 67, at 1160-61.
115 Id. at 1160. Costs and fees include :"the arbitrators' fees, administrative fees, travel
expenses, out-of-pocket expenses such as copying and telephone, court costs, witness fees,
and attorneys' fees." Id.
116 Colorado Model, supra note 67, at 1160. The New York Bank's contract includes
this clause. ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTrTUTIONS, supra note 41, at 71.
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specifically to the transaction over which there is a dispute. 117 This option
would not be appropriate in those arbitration contracts which purport to
cover any and all controversies between the parties, including incidents such
as slip and fall claims. 118
An important unsettled issue is whether arbitrators have the authority to
award punitive damages. 119 While many contracts are silent on the matter,
the arbitration contract used by Republic National Bank 12
of0 New York
specifically provides that the arbitrator has no such authority.
C. Applicable FederalArbitrationLaw
As discussed above, 121 several financial institutions specifically provide
that the FAA 122 shall apply to the arbitration agreement. This section will
briefly describe the major features of the FAA and examine those sections
and case law which may be of particular benefit to financial institutions that
wish to arbitrate disputes with consumers under the aegis of the FAA.
123
The FAA applies to arbitration agreements "involving commerce."
"Commerce" is defined as "commerce among the several states." 12
Because of the interstate nature of financial transactions, most bankconsumer arbitration contracts undoubtedly fall within this definition.
The Act declares that arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable" unless grounds exist "at law or in equity" to revoke the
agreement. State law governs questions relating to the validity, revocability,
117 ColoradoModel, supra note 67, at 1160-61.
118 See supra text accompanying note 63.
1 19
See infra text accompanying notes 158-66, 265.
120

Hochman, supra note 45, at 48 (the contract's parties are the bank and the

guarantor).
121 See supra text accompanying note 65.
122 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Congress did not engage in a careful

consideration of arbitration legislation. Consequently, the legislative history is not very
helpful. Congress "rubber stamped" the bill proposed by the American Arbitration
Association.
IAN
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW:
REFORMATIONNATIONAUIZATION-INTERNATIONAUZATION

107 (1992).

123 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
115 S.CL 930 (1995), the Supreme Court broadly construed Section 2 of the FAA to have a
meaning identical to statutes governing all transactions "affecting" commerce. The Court
rejected the holding of the Alabama Supreme Court which inquired into whether the parties to
the agreement contemplated substantial interstate activity when they entered into their
agreement. Instead, the Court held the inquiry should be whether, in fact, the transaction
involved interstate commerce.

124 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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and enforceability of the arbitration contract. 125 Grounds for revocation
127

126
mistake, and duress.
include fraud related to the arbitration contract,
Courts have declared arbitration contracts unenforceable because they are
unconscionable. 128 As with any contract, arbitration contracts must satisfy
the traditional requirements of contract law including capacity 29 and
consideration. 3 0
Under section 3 of the FAA, if a party brings suit instead of going to

arbitration, the other party can obtain a stay. 13' If one party refuses to
arbitrate, the other party can petition a federal district court for an order
32

directing the parties to arbitrate according to their arbitration agreement.'
The court will hold a hearing to determine if a valid arbitration contract
exists and if the accused party has failed to arbitrate in accordance with the
agreement. If a party claims the agreement is not valid, the court, not the
33
arbitrator, decides that issue.1
The court will appoint a single arbitrator unless the agreement provides
for a method to select the arbitrator or provides for more than one abitrator,
or both. 134 The arbitrator may issue summonses to witnesses as well as
subpoena their books, records, etc. 135 The arbitrator can also petition the
district court to compel attendance. If the arbitration agreement so provides,
an arbitration award may be confirmed by the district court. 136 The FAA
provides very limited grounds for a court to vacate, 137 modify, or correct
125 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
126 Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton, 925 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.
1991).
127 County of Middlesex v. Geryn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
128 Miller v. AAACon Auto Transp., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 40, 42 (S.D. Fla. 1977). See
infra text accompanying notes 276-332.
129 American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville - Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 817
(6th Cir. 1959).
130 Hull v. Norcom, 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985).
131 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
1 32
Id. § 4.
133 A/S Ganger Rolf v. Zeeland Transp., Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
'34 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
135 Id. § 7.
136 id. § 9.
1 37
Id. § 10. Compare Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994)
(no grounds to vacate award even though prevailing party informed the arbitrators of opposing
party's settlement offers in order to influence the arbitrators) with Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d
1043 (9th Cir. 1994) (award vacated where arbitrator failed to disclose that his law firm had
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the arbitrator's award.138 In short, the FAA promotes arbitration by
providing for the enforceability of valid arbitration agreements, the stay of
pending litigation, and the finality of the arbitrator's award.
The significance of the FAA's judicial sanction to a non-judicial
procedure (which largely precludes access to a judicial forum) can be
appreciated by comparing certain features of arbitration and adjudication.
Obviously, in arbitration, the parties waive their rights to factfinding by a
jury of their peers.13 9 They also surrender their rights to a trial presided
over by a judge who is an elected or appointed public official. In addition,
the parties surrender their rights to full-blown discovery. 140 The arbitrator
can issue a summons duces tecum requiring a witness to bring documents to

the hearing, 14 1 and if necessary may grant an adjournment so the parties can
study them. t42 This is a far cry, however, from a party having at its
disposal the wide array of discovery techniques such as interrogatories,
motions to produce documents, depositions, etc. While discovery can
greatly prolong litigation and increase its cost, it also narrows the issues,
reduces surprises, 143 and may encourage settlement.'"
As a general rule, arbitration's limits on discovery probably favor
financial institutions in disputes with consumers. In consumer disputes with
financial institutions, it is often impossible for the consumer to prevail
absent discovery because the institution or third parties have within their
exclusive possession the critical information and documents the consumer

previously represented parent company of one of the parties even though he had no actual bias
since he was unaware of law firm's past representation when he decided the arbitration case).
138 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988 &Supp. 1992).
139 The waiver must be knowingly made. Woodyard v. Merrill Lynch, 640 F. Supp.
760, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
140 The restrictions on discovery may have their origins in the nature of early
commercial arbitration. "[C]ommercial arbitration originally developed in the context of
disputes about a single mercantile transaction such as a shipment of tea, and the notion that
additional new and vital facts might be discovered in the course of the proceedings, and [thus]
might require amendment of the original claim, was probably foreign to that single-transaction
mercantile context." BERTHOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK § 8-6
(1990). In addition to the discovery restrictions of the FAA, extensive discovery is
discouraged by the AAA. An arbitrator likely will not order depositions "even if the need is
compelling, because such a procedure is outside the norm of AAA practice." ld.§ 6-34.
141 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
142 Nicholas J. Healy, An Introduction to the FederalArbitrationAct, 13 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 223, 226 (1982).
143 Hoellering & Goetz, supra note 36, at 58.
144 Gregory P. Joseph, Discovery Should Not Be Abolished, ARE. J., Sept. 1992, at 61.
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needs to prove the case. 4 5 Moreover, in cases involving expert witnesses, it
often is necessary for the expert to review material in the opponent's
possession before the hearing in order to adequately prepare and present
satisfactory testimony. As discussed infra, arbitration's restrictions on
discovery may be particularly detrimental to consumers in certain types of
disputes. 146
The FAA does not require the arbitrator to rule according to the law.'
In Wilko v. Swan, however, the Supreme Court stated in dictum that courts
could vacate an award if it is made in "manifest disregard" of the law. 148 in
49
addition, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,1
the Court said that "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."150 Although not
adopted by every circuit,15 1 those courts which have adopted the manifest
disregard standard have required something "more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law." 152 Rather, there must be proof
in the record that the arbitrator "knew the law and expressly disregarded
it."15s As a practical matter it may be impossible for a party to meet this
standard because the FAA does not require the arbitrator to explain the
reasons for his or her award and there need not be a complete record of the
proceedings. 15
Because arbitrators are not required to strictly follow the law, they can
do what seems fair 55 or just. 156 It is not clear whether this standard favors
14 5

JONATHAN SHELDON, CREDIT DIscRIMINATION 141 (The Consumer Credit & Sales

Legal Practice Series, 1993).
146 See infra text accompanying note 356.
147 Vilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
148 Id. at 436-37.
149 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

150 Id. at 628.
151 Compare Merrill Lynch v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (court defines
and applies the manifest disregard standard) with Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539,
550 (8th Cir. 1991) (court declines to decide whether to adopt the manifest disregard
standard).
152 Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 933.
153 O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir.
1988). See also Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 933.
154 Vilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
155 University of Alaska v. Modem Const., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974)
(decided under the Uniform Arbitration Act).
156 Metropolitan Waste Control Comm'n v. City of Minnetonka, 242 N.W.2d 830, 832
(Minn. 1976) (decided under the Uniform Arbitration Act). A survey of the arbitration of
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consumers or financial institutions. In cases where a consumer suffers
serious injury or the bank's conduct is especially harsh, insensitive, or
careless, the consumer loses the opportunity to play upon the jury's
emotions. On the other hand, where the consumer is in default on a debt or
has a claim based on a legal technicality or boring, complicated facts, an
arbitrator might be at least as favorable as a judge and jury.
Arbitration hearings are private. Privacy favors financial institutions
which would prefer that disputes with consumers not be made public.
Publicity may decrease consumers' trust and confidence in their financial
institutions 157 and may disclose practices and procedures which, even if
perfectly legal, these institutions would prefer remain private.
One of the financial institution's objectives in requiring consumers to
arbitrate is to avoid the punitive damage awards which juries have rendered
in lender liability cases.158 It is not clear whether this objective would be
achieved in arbitration cases decided under the FAA. Whereas the Second
Circuit has refused to permit arbitrators to award punitive damages, 159 the
First, 160 Ninth, 161 and Eleventh 62 Circuits have authorized arbitrators to do
so. The other circuits have not decided this issue, so a financial institution
is risking a possible punitive damage award in those circuits. Moreover,
even in the circuits where courts have decided, the results often have
depended upon the terms in the arbitration contracts before the courts. For
example, courts have been influenced by choice of law clauses 163 and
clauses incorporating the rules of the AAA.164 Financial institutions

consumer disputes with travel agents in Great Britain found that arbitrators tended to find

some merit in both sides' arguments and consequently "split the difference." Tamara Goriely,
How WellDo ConsumerArbitrationSchemes Work?, 141 NEw L.J. 535, 536 (1991).

157 See generallyMcLaughlin, supra note 33.
158 Memorandum From Attorneys Committee, California League of Savings Institutions,
(Feb. 1989), reproducedin ADR FOR FINANcIAL INsTrruTIONS, supra note 41, at 12.
159 Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991);
Falmestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

942 (1991).
16 0

Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1989).

161 Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th Cir.
1991).
162 Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (1 th Cir. 1988).
163 Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062-63; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387. Where an
arbitration agreement contains no express reference to claims for punitive damages, a
contracual choice of law provision does not preclude punitive damages. Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 1995 U.S. LExis 1820 (March 6, 1995).
164 Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1379-80; Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9-10.
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frequently incorporate the AAA rules,1 65 apparently because incorporation
allows them to use the services of the AAA and the rules prove to be an
efficient and effective framework in which to arbitrate. Ironically,
incorporating those rules helps to persuade some courts that the arbitrator
has the power to award punitive damages because the AAA rules do not
prohibit the award of such damages. 166 Even in jurisdictions which allow
the arbitrator to award punitive damages, financial institutions may be better
off than in court. Juries composed of other consumers who themselves or
whose relatives and friends may have had unsatisfactory experiences with
financial institutions may be more inclined to award punitive damages - or
punitive damages in greater amounts - than an arbitrator who is likely to
be a business person or an attorney.
Class actions have been a fruitful and efficient device for consumers to
achieve redress. 167 In addition, they likely deter many creditors from
be
violating consumer protection laws. Lenders have found class actions to 168
them.
avoid
to
part,
in
arbitration,
to
resort
thus
and
threat
an expensive
Neither the FAA nor the UAA contain provisions that specifically address
the availability of class arbitration, and the courts are split on this issue. In
Gammaro v. Thorp ConsumerDiscount Co. ,169 a federal district court held
that it was without power to order a dispute to proceed to arbitration as a
class action because the arbitration agreement failed to provide for class
treatment of disputes. In contrast, other courts have held that class treatment
is allowed, although some decisions provide that the trial court should
intervene to insure the integrity of the procedure. 170
165 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
166 "The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and
equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties .....

COULSON, supra note

75, at 40.
16 7

See YVONNE W. ROSMARIN & DANIEL A. EDELMAN, CONSUMER CLASS AcrIONS 15

(2d ed. 1990).
168 McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 24; Shields, supra note 3, at 52.
169 828 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (D. Minn. 1993), appeal dismissed, 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir.
1994).
170 See Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 864-67 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (allowing class treatment even though no explicit authorization in arbitration
contract; trial court should certify class, insure adequate provision for notice, and review
order to make certain that absent class members are properly represented); Izzy v. Mesquite
Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Ct. App. 1986) (court may need to be involved to
insure appropriate procedures are followed, but should not unduly interfere so advantages of
arbitration are lost); Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103, 106 (Ga. 1978) (trial judge
properly limited those who could be in class to insure practicability of class treatment). See
also Note, Classwide Arbitration:Efficient Adjudication or ProceduralQuagmire?, 67 VA. L.
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The arbitrator is not required to follow the law or write an opinion
finding facts and explaining the basis for the award. 17 1 This spares the
financial institution the bad publicity surrounding unfavorable factual
determinations and the leverage other consumers would receive from legal
precedents beneficial to them. On the other hand, it also precludes the
opportunity to counter publicity of alleged problems with favorable
arbitration factfinding and legal precedent. Where the law is unsettled, both
172
parties are deprived of clear rules to guide future conduct.
Finally, banks which have chosen to arbitrate under the FAA have the
benefit of a Supreme Court which in recent years has enthusiastically and
uncritically embraced the FAA. 173 It was not always so. In the 1953 case of
Wilko v. Swan,17 4 the Court recognized some of the fundamental differences
between arbitration and adjudication. These include the lack of a complete
record, awards without reasoned explanations and without the requirement
of correctly applying the law, as well as the unavailability of judicial review
for errors of law. 175 The Court held that Congress did not intend to deprive
investors suing under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 of the right
to adjudicate their claims. 1 76 One factor influencing the Court was that the
parties did not "deal at arm's length on equal terms" 177 because of the

brokers' superior knowledge of business factors affecting securities. The
Court was persuaded that Congress intended to protect investors from this
disadvantageous situation. This factor also is present in consumer relations
with financial institutions where the institution has superior knowledge and
greater bargaining power, and Congress seeks to protect the consumer.' 7 8
Subsequent cases have completely undermined Wilko, both in terms of
its protective approach to investors 179 and its generally cautious approval of
REV. 787, 800-01 (1981).
171 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).

172 See infra text accompanying notes 359-62, 453.
173 In addition to the Supreme Court decisions noted herein, former Chief Justice

Warren Burger actively promoted arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution
as a solution to court congestion and other societal problems. See Warren E. Burger, The

State ofJustice, A.B.A. I., Apr. 1984, Cit. 62.
174 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
175 Id. at 436-37.
Id. at 438.
1 77
Id. at 435.
178 See, e.g., KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ERNEST L. SARASON, TRUTH INLENDING 25 (2d
17 6

ed. 1989).
179

Shearson/Ameican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1987)

(refusing to extend Wilko to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (overruling Wiko).
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arbitration. Presently, the Court presumes that arbitration contracts should
be upheld. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration to prove that
Congress intended to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for statutory
rights. 18 0 The Court has specifically rejected its previous decisions in which
unequal bargaining power was a factor. 181 The fundamental differences
between arbitration and adjudication have been dismissed without any
recognition of those differences. For example, in Shearson/Amenrican
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, derided Wiko as "reflect[ing] a general suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals," 182 and
"mistrust of the arbitral process." 183 The Court found that the Wiko
attitude toward arbitration was unjustified, given the SEC's oversight
authority which would ensure the adequacy of the process. 184 In addition,
the Court rejected the assumption that arbitrators would not decide cases
consistent with the law. This rejection was based on the belief that judicial
review "is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements
of the statute."185 Rather than explain how the limited judicial review
permitted under the FAA and case law provided this assurance, the Court
referred to portions of the Mitsubishi decision in which the court noted, in a
case involving an international transaction, that an international arbitration
tribunal is not obligated to follow the legal norms or statutory dictates of
any one country. 18 6 If the parties, however, have agreed that the tribunal
has the authority to decide claims "arising from the application of American
antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that dispute
in accord with the national law giving rise to the claim." 187 Justice
Blackmun dissented in McMahon, noting that "[elven those who favor the
arbitration of securities claims do not contend, however, that arbitration has
changed so significantly as to eliminate the essential characteristics noted by
the Wilko Court."' 88
180 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
181 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
18 2
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231.
183id.

184 Id. at 233. A GAO report found that the SEC needed to improve its oversight of
securities industry arbitration. Markey Says GAO Report Finds Flaws in Arbitration of
DiscriminationCases, 26 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 509, 510 (April 8, 1994).
1 85
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233.
186 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636
(1985).
187 Id. at 636-37.
188 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 259 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens has dissented in various FAA cases based on his review
of the legislative history of the FAA. He concluded that it was not
Congress' intention to include within the FAA either statutory claims or
"form contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power." 189 In his
estimation, recent Court decisions construing the FAA amount to the Court
rewriting the Act. 190

Supreme Court cases have left unclear the power of state legislatures to
prohibit the arbitration of disputes governed by the FAA. In Southland
Corp. v. Keat'ng,191 the Court considered a California franchise investment
law which the California Supreme Court had interpreted to require judicial
determination of any disputes arising under the law. The Court held that the
FAA preempts state laws which "require a judicial forum for the resolution
19
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,193 the parties'
arbitration contract provided that the contract "shall be governed by the law
of the place where the Project is located." 194 The Supreme Court upheld the
Court of Appeals finding that this provision had the effect of incorporating
California arbitration rules which permitted a stay of arbitration under the
circumstances of the case. The Court acknowledged that the contract was
governed by the FAA and the FAA had no provision allowing a stay in this
situation. The Court justified adhering to state law, nevertheless, by
insisting it was merely enforcing the parties' agreement. It is interesting to
note, in light of Southland and other decisions in which the Court blindly
followed the FAA, that in Volt the Court stated that "It]he FAA contains no
express pre-emption [sic] provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. "195 The issue of preemption
is important because several states exempt consumer transactions from
arbitration. 196 These state exemptions appear to be ineffective after

Southland. After Volt, the ineffectiveness may be dependent upon language
197
in the parties' contract.

189 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 42 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
190 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

191 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
192 Ild. at 10.
193 489 U.S. 468 (1989).

194 ILd. at 470.
195 id. at 477.
196 See infra text accompanying notes 268-71.
19 7

IAN R. MACNEL- ET AL., 2 FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAw 16:90 (1994) ("ITihe Volt

doctrine is in its infancy, and how far it goes in conferring freedom on the parties to choose
state law remains unclear.").
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In contrast to the possible softening of approach evidenced in Volt, the
Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson1 98 adopted a broad
reading of the FAA's preemptive effect where a transaction involves
interstate commerce, and strongly reaffirmed Southland in the face of a
concurring opinion and two dissents which questioned the correctness of
Southland. Justice O'Connor, concurring, expressed the concern that the
majority's decision would "displace many state statutes carefully calibrated
to protect consumers... and state procedural requirements aimed at
ensuring knowing and voluntary consent."199 In apparent response, the
majority stated that states could still protect consumers by applying general
contract law principles. 20 0 In addition, the Court noted that Section 2 of the
FAA authorizes a court to invalidate an arbitration clause if grounds exist
for doing so under the rules for revoking contracts. The next section of this
article discusses state arbitration law and should be read in the context of
the expansive reach of the FAA as constured in Allied-Bruce.
D. Applicable State ArbitrationLaw
The persons promoting the UAA were motivated by their belief that it
20 1
would encourage increased use of arbitration in commercial transactions.
2
0
2
Thirty-five states have adopted the UAA.
The UAA is substantially
similar to the FAA. For purposes of this article, it is instructive to examine
UAA case law for the lessons that case law can teach banks and consumers
concerning problem areas. Bank of America's contract provides that
California arbitration law applies rather than the FAA, 20 3 and other
financial institutions may follow its example. In addition, individual states
have adopted unique ways to deal with certain situations which provide
insights on how rules for bank-consumer disputes might be structured.
These insights will be explored in Part VI.
Several aspects of the arbitration contract have been explored in cases
decided under the UAA. These cases are also relevant to litigation decided
under the FAA because state law applies to questions involving the validity
198 115 S.Ct. 930 (1995).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 MACNEIL, supra note 122, at 44.
202 UNIF. ARE. Acr, 7 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1993). An Alabama statute declares predispute
arbitration agreements to be unenforceable. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (1993). The scope of such

statutes may have been considerably narrowed by the Supreme Court's broad construction of
the interstate commerce reach of Section 2 of the FAA in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).
203 Palmer, supra note 41, at 981.
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of contracts under the federal Act. 204 The Florida Court of Appeals has
established minimum requirements for arbitration contracts which provide
guidance to institutions drafting those agreements. The court stated that an
arbitration contract must be definite enough to give the parties some idea of
what matters are to be submitted to arbitration. 205 The court warned that it
would construe ambiguous provisions in favor of the party seeking a ruling
that the arbitration contract is invalid. As discussed in Part IV, this may
present problems for the wide-ranging "dragnet" clauses used by some
banks. 20 6 In addition, the court required arbitration contracts to provide

some detail as to the arbitration procedure which will apply.20 7 As discussed
in Part IV, this requirement raises the issue of whether simply
referring to
20 8
AAA procedures in a contract with a consumer is adequate.
The burden is on the party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement
to show that the opposing party "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily"
waived his or her right to a trial in court. 20 9 Missouri attempted to assure
this by enacting a non-uniform amendment to its UAA which requires
arbitration contracts to include the following disclosure in ten point capital
letters: THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION
210
PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.
Michigan goes even further, requiring that patients be furnished brochures
describing the arbitration procedure they are subjecting themselves to by
211
signing an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims.
Contracts subject to the UAA have been attacked as unconscionable,
with results varying depending upon the facts. In one case, the contract
provided that insureds were bound by arbitration awards, but the insurance
company was bound only if it consented in writing. 212 The court declared

204

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).

2 05

Wood-Hopkins Contracting Co. v. C.H. Barco Contracting Co., 301 So. 2d 479,

480 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1974).
206 See infra text accompanying note 326.
207 Wood-Hopkins Contracting Co., 301 So. 2d at 480.
2 08

See infra text accompanying notes 313-15, 322.

2 09

Roberts v. McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Mich. Ct.

App. 1984).
2 10

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.460 (Vernon 1989). See

efele v. Catanzaro, 727 S.W.2d

475, 476-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). But see Hamilton Metals, Inc. v. Blue Valley Metal Prod.
Co., 763 S.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Mo. CL App. 1989) (arbitration contract is enforceable even

if it omits required disclosure if opposing party had actual notice of the arbitration agreement).
211 Roberts, 360 N.W.2d at 281.
212 Fritz v. Nationwide MuL Ins. Co., Civ. No. 1369, 1990 WL 186448 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 26, 1990).
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the contract unconscionable because it was "unfairly structured."213 On the
other hand, in a medical malpractice case, a court rejected an
unconscionability claim based on the argument that the AAA's fees were
oppressive. 214 The court pointed out that the fees were much less than the
cost of litigating the claim. Moreover, the AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules provide that "in the event of extreme hardship" the administrative fee
215
can be deferred or reduced.
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that certain insurance arbitration
contracts are against public policy. 216 The contract in Worldwide provided
that if the arbitration award exceeded the state financial responsibility
limits, either party could appeal the decision for a judicial trial de novo. If
the award was below those limits, however, the award was not appealable.
Noting that the practical effect was to provide the insurance company with
the right to appeal while denying that right to the insured, the court struck
down the contract and declared that it "promotes litigation, circumvents the
arbitration process and provides an escape device in favor of the insurance
company. "217
Some states have dealt with claims that the arbitration contract should
be struck down because it provides for a forum inconvenient to one of the
parties. A Michigan statute declares unenforceable arbitration clauses in
franchise agreements requiring arbitration outside Michigan unless, at the
218
time of arbitration, the franchisee agrees to arbitrate outside the state.
Oregon's arbitration statute invalidates contracts that provide for arbitration
outside the state. 219 Courts have interpreted Florida's law as rendering
220
agreements calling for out of state arbitration unenforceable.
The arbitrator obviously is a key player in the arbitration process. Guill
and Slavin have expressed serious concerns about their selection,
qualification, and ethics. 221 Whereas judges are subject to careful public
scrutiny prior to appointment or election, neither the public nor any
213 Friz, Civ. No. 1369, 1990 WL 186448.
214 Broemmer v. Otto, 821 P.2d 204, 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
215 COULSON, supra note 75, at 40-41.
216 Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788, 790 (Del. 1992). On the
relationship between the public policy defense and the FAA, see MACNEIL ET AL., supra note
196, at 16:11-16:16.
217 Worldwide Ins. Group, 603 A.2d at 791.
218 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1527(f)

(West 1989).

See Hambell v.

Alphagraphics Franchising Inc., 779 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
219 OR. REV. STAT. § 36.305 (1991).
220 Donmoor, Inc. v. Sturtevant, 449 So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
221 James L. Guill & Edward A. Slavin, Rush to Unfairness: The Downside of ADR, 28
JUDGE'S J., Summer 1989, at 8.
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governmental body has input into the process private arbitration
222
The
organizations use to determine whether arbitrators are qualified.
committee
membership
National Academy of Arbitrators found that AAA's

had inadequate information by which to judge an arbitrator's
qualifications. 223 The parties can only prevent their case being heard by an
arbitrator they consider unqualified or biased by not selecting that
arbitrator. A "repeat player" such as a lender which determines the
arbitration organization and uses arbitration frequently, however, has a
decided advantage over the "one shot" player such as the consumer. The
repeat player is far more likely to know the persons in the arbitration
pool. 224 Moreover, the pool may be severely limited. A GAO report found
that most arbitrators in employment discrimination cases involving the
securities industry were white males with an average age of 60. 225 Finally,

authorities question whether the parties have sufficient assurance the
arbitrator will act ethically. Although there is an arbitrator's code of
professional responsibility, 226 a report by the Committee on Professionalism
of the National Academy of Arbitrators "reported no working ethics
enforcement mechanism. "227

Courts, however, generally have been unsympathetic to challenges to
the selection of the arbitrator. 228 When a brokerage employee objected to
the arbitration tribunals established by the New York Stock Exchange to
hear employee grievances, the Second Circuit refused to side with the
employee absent evidence of actual unfairness in the way the tribunals

222 Guill & Slavin, supra note 221, at 11.
223 Id
224

Id. at 10. See also 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1202 (West) requiring proposed neutral

arbitrators to disclose the names of prior and pending cases in which they served as party
arbitrators, and the names of cases involving any party to the instant arbitration agreement or
the lawyer for a party for which the proposed person served as neutral arbitrator, and the
results of each case. For a general analysis of the concepts of repeat and one shot players, see
Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the LTmits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
2 25
Markey Says GAO Report Finds Fkaws in Arbitration of Discrimination Cases, supra
note 184, at 510. See generally Guill & Slavin, supra note 221, at 12, citing a New York
Times article reporting that most arbitrators are white males over the age of 65.
226
Guill & Slavin, supra note 221, at 12.
227
Id. at 11.
228 De Seife explains the importance of the arbitrator: "[l]t is the arbitrator who must
build a record to satisfy himself that justice is served. In this nonadversarial, inquisitorial role,
it is the arbitrator who must see to it that proper discovery is made; therefore, the importance
of picking a good arbitrator cannot be underestimated." DE SEIFE, supra note 37, at 39.
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operated.2 2 1 The court expressed its appreciation for those willing to serve
as arbitrators, for it believed arbitration is a "generally thankless task" and
those agreeing to be arbitrators are performing a service. A person with a
medical malpractice claim asked a court to strike down as unconscionable an
arbitration clause which required the arbitrator to be an obstetrician.2 30 The
court refused to assume that an obstetrician would be biased; consequently,
the court required the patient to prove actual bias. The California Supreme
Court has shown somewhat more of an inclination to entertain challenges to
the selection of arbitrators where the arbitration agreement is an adhesion
contract where the possibility of overreaching is present. 231 The court
insisted upon a standard of "minimal levels of integrity."232 The objective
of this standard was to ensure that the weaker party would have a "realistic
and fair opportunity to prevail in a dispute."233
The neutrality of arbitrators is an important issue in those situations
where the institution imposing arbitration on a weaker party specifies a forprofit company as the source of the arbitrator. "For-profit
arbitrations... generate inherent conflicts of interest, including the ADR
provider's pursuit of repeat business from high-volume customers." 234 In
addition to the courts' reluctance to interfere, at least one of the major forprofit companies has no internal review procedure to assure neutrality and
2 35
quality control.
Further complicating the issue of the neutrality of arbitrators is the use
of sitting judges as arbitrators. In DDI Seamless Cylinder v. General Fire
Extinguisher,236 the parties agreed that an independent auditor would decide
229 Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1978).
230 Broemmer v. Otto, 821 P.2d 204, 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
231 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). See also Neaman v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 883 (Ct. App. 1992) (improper for arbitrator to fail to
disclose that he served as the party-chosen arbitrator for one of the parties to the instant

action).
232 Graham, 623 P.2d at 176.
233 id.

234 Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, 14 CAL. LAw. 53, 54. See also
Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Roundzable, THE RECORDER 1, 11 (Spring 1993); Moore v.
Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 222-23 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting) (neutral decision-making
cannot be guaranteed where person serves repeatedly as arbitrator for same institutional
litigant). This problem was probably exacerbated by the merger of two of the largest ADR
firms, Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc. and Endispute. See generally Bill

Rankin, Merger of Two Companies Forms America's Largest Mediation Firm, ATLANTA
CONST., May 13, 1994, at E2.
235 Reuben, supra note 234, at 53.
236 14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994).
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what losses were sustained by each party, and if the parties objected, the
magistrate judge to whom their case was assigned would act as an arbitrator.
The parties decided upon this arrangement in order to obtain a speedier
resolution of their dispute. The Seventh Circuit upheld this agreement.
While acknowledging that neither the FAA nor other federal law permits
federal judges to act as arbitrators, the court characterized their agreement
as one which established "an abbreviated, informal procedure" for the judge
to follow in his "judicial capacity." 237 In addition, the court assumed that
the parties intended that the appellate court's judicial review of the judge's
decision in their dispute would be limited to the narrow grounds permitted
in arbitration. The court found the parties had the power to agree to a
limited review. The only fault the court found in the agreement was the
parties' references to arbitration. 238 The parties should have agreed to
follow arbitration procedures, but avoided using that term. Connecticut has
adopted a variation of this setup. In Connecticut, sitting judges can work 239
for
a firm, STA-FED ADR, Inc., which mediates and arbitrates disputes.
Critics have expressed concern over the "potential for conflicts of interest"
in this scheme. 24 0
The state courts have supported the doctrine allowing arbitrators to
decide based on what is fair241 and just 242 rather than what the law
requires. 24 3 Some state courts24 4 have adopted the "manifest disregard"
standard proposed for FAA cases in Wilko v. Swan. 24 5 The courts refuse to
consider "even gross errors of judgement in law" unless they are apparent
on the face of the award. 246 This precludes most challenges based on an
erroneous application of the law because the arbitrator is not required to
give reasons for the award. 247 The Michigan Supreme Court is somewhat
more inclined to consider an arbitrator's error of law where the arbitration
contract provides that the arbitration award may be entered as a judgment in
2 37

DDISeamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1166.
238 Id.
239 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-47(c); 51-50c(g); 51-50k; 52-434(g) (West 1991

& Supp. 1994).
2 40
Kirk Johnson, Public Judges as Private Contractors:A Legal Frontier,N.Y. TiMES,

Dec. 10, 1993, at D20 (quoting Judge Wayne D. Brazil).
241 University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., In., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974).
24 2
Metropolitan Waste Control Comm'n v. City of Minnetonka, 242 N.\V.2d 830,
832-33 (Minn. 1976).
243 See Aptowitzer, supra note 37, at 1001-06.
244 Batten v. Howell, 389 S.E.2d 170, 172 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
245 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
246 Johnson v. Baunmgardt, 576 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

247 Batten, 389 S.E.2d at 172.
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that state's courts. That court rejected the manifest disregard standard and
held that the arbitrator cannot "ignore controlling principles of law, either
intentionally or unintentionally, even with the consent of the parties, and
expect ultimate judicial imprimatur as well." 248
In an attempt to foreclose most review of appeals based on an alleged
error of law, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that in arbitration
cases, it does not sit as a court to hear such appeals. 24 9 The court went on,
however, to state that it was willing "to safeguard against interpretive error
that may be characterized on its face as gross, unmistakable, undebatable, or
in manifest disregard of the applicable law and leading to an unjust
result. " 250 Two years later the court rejected this standard and permitted
judicial review based only on narrow statutory grounds and exceptional
251
public policy reasons.
The California Supreme Court, often a bellwether, held that an
arbitrator's decision is binding and final and therefore cannot be reviewed
on the basis of an error of law. In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,252 the court
noted that although California had not adopted the UAA, its statutory
provisions on judicial review "largely mirror" those of the UAA. 253 Those
provisions list the grounds for review; no other grounds are permissible.
Therefore, the court would not consider the contention that the arbitrator
254
committed an error of law which appeared on the face of the decision.
The court justified its ruling, inter alia, on the basis that the parties had
agreed to arbitrate their dispute; consequently, they decided a possible nonreviewable error of law was an "acceptable cost" in light of the benefits of
arbitration. 255 Furthermore, the court stated that even if the arbitration
agreement had not demonstrated the parties' intent that the arbitrator's
decision be final and binding, this intent is implied in every arbitration
contract. 256 The court left only one loophole. A court could consider a
claim that the entire underlying transaction was illegal. The instant case was
248 Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 430 (Mich. 1982). The
error, however, must be "so material or so substantial as to have governed the award, and but
for which the award would have been substantially otherwise." Id. at 434.
249 Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 372-73 (N.J.
1992).

25 0

Id. at 373.
251 Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 640 A.2d 788, 793 (N.J.
1994).
252 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
253

Id. at 915.

254 Id. at 916.

255 Id. at 905.
2 56
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distinguished because only one provision of the challenged employment
contract was alleged to be illegal, not the whole contract. Furthermore, a
court could review such a transaction only if "granting finality... would

be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory rights." 257 The
court went on to suggest it also would require a clear legislative statement
that it would be against public policy to decide the matter by arbitration. 258
In a strong dissent, Justice Kennard contended a court's obligation to
"do justice" overrode the state's policy favoring arbitration. 259 Therefore, a
court could review an arbitrator's decision if it is erroneous on its face and
results in substantial injustice. 260 He ridiculed the notion that the parties to
arbitration "agree also to be bound by an award that on its face is manifestly
erroneous and results in substantial injustice." 261 The dissent criticized the
majority for equating a mere mistake with substantial injustice.
262
The California Court of Appeal, in Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co.,
has tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to limit the scope of Moncharsh to
cases where the parties have equal bargaining power. 263 The court refused
to assume that "elderly, unsophisticated and financially distressed"
consumers 264 who refinanced their homes through the defendant mortgage
company, fully appreciated the consequences of agreeing to arbitrate. In
deciding to order that Bell not be published in the official reports, the
California Supreme Court seems to be signalling its continuing satisfaction
with Moncharsh.
The courts deciding cases under the UAA are split on whether the
arbitrator has the authority to award punitive damages. Some courts hold
the arbitrator has the power to do so where the arbitration clause is broad,
such as those covering any dispute which arises under the underlying
contract. 265 Other courts refuse to grant the arbitrator the authority to award
punitive damages unless the arbitration contract expressly authorizes the
award of such damages. 266 As seen above, 267 some banks have drafted very
257

Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 919.
258 Id. at 899.
259

Id. at 920 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).

260 id,
261 Id.

262 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1994).
263

Id. at 210.

264

Id. at 209.
265 Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559, 565 (D.S.D. 1987);
Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ala.
1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1lth Cir. 1985).
266 International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104,

1109 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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broad arbitration contracts. While these have the advantage of preventing
consumers from seeking judicial redress for a wide variety of claims,
ironically those broadly drafted contracts also may prompt some courts to
hold that the arbitrator has authority to award punitive damages.
Several states have excluded certain types of transactions from coverage
under their arbitration statutes. 268 Of particular interest are exclusions of
consumer transactions.
Indiana
excludes
consumer
leases,
sales,
or
loan
contracts .... Texas, Montana, and Georgia exclude transactions where
the consideration is less than a certain dollar amount. Texas includes such
contracts within the law if the arbitration agreement is separately signed or
initialed. Georgia also has a similar provision for residential real estate
contracts.

269

In addition, some states require that all arbitration contracts meet certain
minimum standards. These standards are:
[Piresumably to guard against 'surprise' and to insure that consent to
arbitration has been knowing and informed. These include requirements
that arbitration provisions include certain language, that they appear in a
certain size of type, that they be separately initialed, and even that they be
signed by both parties and the parties' attorneys. Arbitration agreements
270
that do not comply with these requirements are unenforceable.

The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that its arbitration statute,
modeled after the UAA, violates the state's constitution to the extent it
authorizes the arbitration of future disputes. 271 Echoing a doctrine that other
courts rejected years ago, the court found that the arbitration statute was
unconstitutional because it ousted the courts of their jurisdiction and
therefore was against public policy.

267 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
268
Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate:
Judicialand Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 4 ANN.
SURv. AM. L. 925, 955-63 (1991); Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's
Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HoFsTRA L.
REv. 385, 401-04 (1992).
269 Breckenridge, supra note 268, at 959-60 (citations omitted).
270 Strickland, supra note 268, at 403-04 (citations omitted).
271 State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991).

298

CONSUMERS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

IV. CONSUMER CHALLENGES To ARBIRATION CONTRACTS

Some consumers may welcome arbitration of their disputes with
financial institutions. Generally, arbitration is faster and less expensive than
litigation. 272 The arbitrator may have greater expertise than a judge. The
arbitration contract may allow the consumer to force the institution to
arbitrate its collection action, which may make such actions more costly and
273
time-consuming than a summary action in court.
Other consumers may decide to challenge the arbitration contracts into
which they have entered with financial institutions. Perhaps they object to
the structural features of arbitration such as the loss of a jury trial and a
judge, the limited right of discovery and appeal, the unlikelihood of class
relief, or the lack of publicity. Or perhaps they object to specific provisions
in the contracts drafted by their creditor. Finally, they may have a
generalized hostility to arbitration because they or someone they know
about had a bad experience with lender arbitration or with other types of
ADR such as non-judicial resolution of disputes under lemon laws. 274 This
section will explore both causes of action which consumers already have
alleged in financial institution-consumer arbitration cases and grounds
which consumers may use in future suits.
Before considering challenges to arbitration contracts, it is important to
keep in mind what types of challenges the court has authority to decide and
what types of attacks are the province of the arbitrator. The court decides
"issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate." 275 Therefore, the court considers attacks on the validity of the
arbitration contract. 276 The arbitrator rules on issues relating to the
277
underlying transaction or contract.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration contracts are valid,
272

Dwight Golan, Developments in Consumer FinancialServices Litigation, 43 Bus.

LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988).
273 ld., at 1092.
2 74
Ronald J. Adams, Florida'sMotor Vehicle ArbitrationBoard - A Two-Year Review,

47 ARB. J. 36, 38-42 (1992). See generally Goriely, supra note 156.
275 Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
276
Richard Speidel, Arbitrationof Statutory Rights Under the FederalArbitration Act:
The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 157, 177 (1989). Once the federal
district court upholds the validity of the contract and orders the parties to proceed to
arbitration, the contract's validity cannot be challenged in the court of appeals until an
arbitration award is issued and the winner seeks enforcement in the district court. Gammaro v.
Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994).
277 Speidel, supra note 276, at 177.
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enforceable, and irrevocable, except insofar as "grounds... exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."278 Pursuant to this provision,
arbitration contracts can be challenged as unconscionable. 279 A lawsuit filed
as a class action successfully attacked IT's arbitration contract on the
grounds of unconscionability. 280 The contract stated that any dispute would
be resolved "by the National Arbitration Forum, Minneapolis,
Minnesota ... "211 The court applied the two alternative approaches used
by California courts when deciding unconscionability claims. One approach
applies to adhesion contracts. If the court finds the contract to be adhesive,
it will deny enforcement if the challenged provision is "outside the
reasonable expectations of the weaker party,"D" 282 or the provision is

"unduly oppressive or unconscionable. "D" 283 The court found that ITT's
arbitration contract was adhesive because it was drafted by the stronger
party and gave the weaker party the choice of either accepting or rejecting
it. Next, the court found that the provision was outside the reasonable
expectations of consumers by suggesting that California residents would be
required to arbitrate their disputes in Minnesota. Finally, the court held that
the procedures employed under ITT's arbitration program were oppressive
to unsophisticated consumers with few resources where small amounts were
284
in dispute.
The court also analyzed the ITT arbitration contract in terms of
substantive and procedural unconscionability. Substantive unconscionability
focuses on "whether the contract allocates the risks of the bargain in an
278 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
279 Speidel, supra note 276, at 176 n.92. See Dwight Golann, Taking ADR to the Bank:
Arbitrationand Mediation in Financial Services Disputes, 44 ARB. J. 3, 10 (1989).
280 Patterson v. IM' Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1993).
In another case, however, the lT arbitration clause was found not to be unconscionable by a
federal district court. Gammaro, 15 F.3d at 95.
281 Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564.
282 Id. at 565.

283 Id. When the FAA was being considered by Congress, a member of the U.S. Senate
expressed concern about the adhesive nature of many arbitration contracts.

MACNEIL, supra
note 122, at 90, 215.
284 Under those procedures, if the consumer submits a written denial to Minnesota, he
or she is deemed to have conferred jurisdiction on an arbitration forum in that state and the
arbitrator will decide solely on the basis of documents. If the consumer wants a hearing, he or
she must promptly demand one and pay a fee. The fee would amount to $850 for a dispute
involving $2000. There is a procedure to waive the requirement of paying fees prior to the
hearing, but the provision explaining the process for waiving the fee was 'incomprehensible.'

Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566.
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objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner." 2 5 Procedural
unconscionability asks whether the contract provision at issue is oppressive
and surprising. 286 According to the Pattersoncourt, California cases require
a finding of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in order for a
court to have the authority to declare the provision unenforceable. 28 7 The
court found the ITT contract substantively unconscionable because the
process was structured in such a way that the consumer would not likely be
able to obtain a hearing. The court also objected to 1T's reluctance to
disclose to the consumer how the process operated until an arbitration claim
is made. Finally, some of the consumers claimed they had not read the
arbitration provision and no one at IT had called the provision to their
attention. The court found that this showed unfairness and surprise - the
elements of procedural unconscionability.
It is unclear whether the contracts used by other financial institutions
are subject to attacks on unconscionability grounds. Although the Patterson
court found the forum selection clause used by ITT to be unconscionable,
other courts may not find such clauses objectionable. 288 Other types of
clauses which courts have found substantively unconscionable in consumer
cases include clauses giving creditors remedies which under the
circumstances courts considered unfair such as: cross-collateralization
clauses, waiver of defense clauses, blanket security agreements, and
acceleration clauses. 289 Patterson may be regarded as a case in which the

court ruled that the creditor remedy was unconscionable because the court
found the arbitration procedure discouraged consumers from responding to
290
the lender's notice of claimu.
Despite the consumer's success in Patterson, California cases
subsequent to Patterson, not involving distant forum clauses, have rejected
challenges based on unconscionability. In McCarthy v. Providential
Corp.,291 a federal district court held that consumers had failed to prove that
an arbitration clause was unconscionable. In regard to their procedural
unconscionability claims, the court found the clause was "clear and
285 Panerson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565.
286
Id. lTr's contract also was found to be unconscionable in Aetna Fin. Co. v.
McGhee, No. 246287 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1993).
287

Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565. In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165

(Cal. 1981), however, the court held an arbitration contract to be unconscionable without
separately identifying what aspects were procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
288 See infra text accompanying notes 329-30.
2 89

YVONNE W. RoSMAuN & JONATHAN SHELDON, SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 615

(1989).
290 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566.

291 No. C 94-0627, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1994).
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unambiguous." 292 The inequality of bargaining power between the
consumers and the mortgage company defendant was not enough, by itself,
to constitute procedural unconscionability. The consumers claimed that the
mortgage company had a duty to explain the arbitration clause. Holding that
federal law applies to attacks on the enforceability of arbitration provisions,
the court declared that federal law does not require any such explanation.
Finally, the court held no substantive unconscionability exists because
arbitration clauses are not automatically biased in favor of one party, and
the consumers failed to show the arbitration tribunal, the American
Arbitration Association, would not treat their case fairly. Furthermore, a
California superior court has upheld Bank of America's arbitration
clause. 293 The court found the plaintiff failed to prove the arbitration clause
was beyond a consumer's reasonable expectations and that arbitration is
designed and operates in a manner unfavorable to consumers in that its costs
are exorbitant and adequate discovery is not available.
Cases not involving lenders, however, may be useful to consumers. For
example, the arbitration contract in one case bound the insured to the
arbitration award, but bound the insurance company only if it consented in
writing. 294 The court held that the contract was unconscionable because it
was "unfairly structured." Courts may consider the structure of arbitration
contracts in determining whether they are set up in a manner which unfairly
disadvantages the consumer. For example, the clauses used by several banks
exclude actions for provisional remedies from arbitration. 295 Because only
the bank would have occasion to take advantage of that exclusion, it may be
considered unconscionable.
The court in Broemmer v. Otto2 96 rejected a challenge to arbitration,
but the arguments made in that challenge are nevertheless relevant. In that
case, a patient with a medical malpractice claim arising from an abortion
alleged the arbitration contract was unconscionable because it required the
arbitrator to be an obstetrician/gynecologist. The court refused to assume
that such an arbitrator would be biased toward the doctor or hospital.
Rather, the court required the patient to prove bias. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that the AAA rules allow a party to object to any proposed
arbitrator and require disclosure of information about any proposed
292

McCarthy, No. C 94-0627, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122.
293 Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 944916, 94 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12377 (Cal. Super.
Aug. 18, 1994).
294 Fritz v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 1369, 1990 WL 186448 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 26, 1990), reh'g denied, 1991 WL 23585 (Feb. 19, 1991).
295 See supra text accompanying note 64.
296 821 P.2d 204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
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arbitrator which would affect that person's ability to be objective. 297
Despite the court's reluctance to find unconscionability in that case,
consumers may be able to successfully challenge arbitration pools if such
demonstrates that
pools consist only of current or retired creditors and data
298
consumers rarely obtain favorable relief in arbitration.
In most states, the consumer is also required to prove procedural
unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability focuses on the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract. Courts have found
299
this type of unconscionability where oppression or unfair surprise exists.
These elements are present where the consumer enters into the contract
without doing so voluntarily and without a clear realization to what she is
agreeing. 300 Courts look at the consumer's lack of sophistication. Most
require "some combination of consumer ignorance and seller guile. "301 The
operative concept in many cases is "lack of meaningful choice" which
includes: "a gross inequality of bargaining power" 302 and consumer
ignorance of contract terms because of the seller's deception or "terms
hidden in a maze of fine print."303 Courts have found procedural
unconscionability where the consumer has no understanding of the contract
05
3
terms 3 4 or additional terms are added after the contract is signed
Standard form contracts are subject
to attack where virtually all other sellers
30 6
use the same type of form.
To the extent that contracts include terms reproduced in fine print on
the reverse side of a document 307 and use excessive "legalese," they are
subject to attack. Also, if the consumer challenging the clause is nonEnglish speaking, 3 8 poor, 309 or unsophisticated, 310 a court is more likely to
297 Accord Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1978) (court refused to assume
unfairness of New York Stock Exchange arbitration panels).
298

See generally GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, SEcuRTIES ARBITRATION: How

INvESToRs FARE 7-8 (1992) (no indication of pro-industry bias, but industry needs to improve
procedures for selecting and training arbitrators).
299 See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
300
RoSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 289, at 611.

301 id.
302 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
303 id.
304 Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969).
305 Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 208 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. App. 1974).

306 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
307 John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Kan. 1986).
308 Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969).
309
RoSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 289, at 613.
310 Id at 620.
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find procedural unconscionability. While the typical bank consumer may be
a relatively sophisticated and well-educated middle class person, more and
more low income consumers are becoming customers as states mandate
basic banking. 311 In addition, courts which view banking services as
necessities are more likely to be sympathetic to arbitration challenges based
on unconscionability. 312 Courts in some jurisdictions are more of a threat to
these clauses than others. For example, the California Court of Appeal in
the successful arbitration challenge in Patterson313 relied heavily on a
previous California decision in a commercial case in which the court
justified its finding of unfairness by pointing out that the
seller had failed to
314
call the disputed contract to the attention of the buyer.
Even if arbitration contracts are in bold-faced type, they may be
vulnerable to a procedural unconscionability attack on the grounds that the
contract fails to adequately explain the arbitration procedure and what the
consumer is surrendering. 315 As described above, 316 most arbitration
contracts used by banks simply refer to the procedural rules of the AAA
rather than describing those rules. Banks may be able to cure this by
including with the arbitration contract a copy of the AAA rules. Zions First
National Bank has adopted an approach somewhere between incorporation
and supplying the rules. Their brochure briefly describes the AAA's
process. 317 With the exception of the Zions arbitration contract, none of the
contracts examined gave consumers a hint as to what they were
surrendering. Zions' disclosures were very brief, but at least provided some
warning to the consumer. 318 Consumers can argue that contracts which fail
to provide adequate disclosures concerning matters as fundamental as loss of
the right to a judicial proceeding, judicial review, and a decision based upon
the law preclude a meaningful choice.
Courts often are hesitant to find a contract's provisions
311 EDWARD

L.

RuBIN

&

ROBERT COOTER,

THE PAYMENT

SYSTEM:

CASES,

MATERIALS, AND ISSUES 147-58 (1989). Edward L. Rubin, The Lifeline Banking Controversy:
PuttingDeregulationto Work for the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. L.J. 213, 216 (1992).
312 Cy. Personal Fin. Co. v. Meredith, 350 N.E.2d 781 (111.App. 1976).
313 Patterson v. ITr Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (1993).
314 A &M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
315 This line of reasoning was rejected in another consumer arbitration case in which the
court held federal law applied and that law imposed no duty on the mortgage company to
explain the arbitration clause where it clearly provided for the arbitration of disputes.
McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. c 94-0627, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10122 (N.D. Cal.
July 18, 1994).
316 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
317 ZIoNS FIRST NAT'L BANK, supra note 87.

318 See supra text accompanying note 87.
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unconscionable. 319 If consumers can frame their objections in terms of other
traditional legal concepts, however, some courts are willing to strike down
the clauses. For example, because arbitration contracts must satisfy the
usual requirements for any contract,3 20 one party challenged the failure of
his contract to explain the arbitration process, not on the basis of
unconscionability, but on the grounds the contract was not sufficiently
definite to be enforceable. The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding the
contract too indefinite, inter alia, because it did not set forth some
procedures which
would be followed if a dispute between the parties went
321
to arbitration.
Instead of arguing unconscionablity due to lack of meaningful choice,
the consumer can rely on cases- holding that a party seeking to enforce an
arbitration agreement must show the other party's waiver of the right to
judicial access was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 322 Particularly in
the case of a less sophisticated customer, a consumer can argue that standard
bank arbitration contracts fail to provide sufficient information for waiver to
be knowing and intelligent.
The California Court of Appeal was influenced by the fact that
arbitration results in the waiver of the right to a jury trial in a case
involving adhesion contracts and "elderly, unsophisticated and financially
distressed" consumers. 32 3 The court found the consumers had not made a
clear and informed waiver where the arbitration agreement was contained in
an unhighlighted paragraph in the middle of a page which was part of a
packet of documents. The court concluded that in order to be enforceable,
an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract must "appear in clear and
unmistakable form by highlighting, bold type, or with an opportunity for
specific acknowledgement by initialing. Enforceability requires a clear
3 19

supra note 289, at 625.
See supra text accompanying notes 129 and 130.
32 1
Vood-Hopkins Contracting Co. v. C.H. Barco Contracting Co., 301 So. 2d 479
ROSMARIN & SHELDON,

320

(Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
322 Roberts v. McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984). A waiver which does not meet this standard may violate due process. Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
323 Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 209 (Ct. App. 1994), petition
for review denied and ordernot to publish in official reports, 94 Daily J. 10597 (Cal. July 28,
1994). See Kathleen V. Fisher, Depublication Was in Public's Best Interest, Bank Counsel
Says, THE REcoRDER, Aug. 8, 1994, at 5; Barbara Steuart, Banking on the Attorney General:
When the AG's Office Asked For the Depublication of a Ruling that Limited Mandatory
Arbitration,It Was Following the Request of Bank ofAmerica, THE RECORDER, Aug. 3, 1994,
at 1.
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recitation that the parties knowingly waive their right to a jury trial. "324
Waiver requirements pose a difficult challenge for banks, for even if
they acknowledge the legitimacy of this argument, it is uncertain how much
information would be necessary to withstand a challenge made on this basis.
For example, is it sufficient to briefly describe the arbitration procedure and
explain that by agreeing to arbitration they are surrendering their right to a
trial in court and that judicial review will be extremely limited? Or must the
bank also describe the various advantages and disadvantages of arbitration
as compared to litigation, including aspects such as discovery, class actions,
and punitive damages? In Patterson,325 the court found the arbitration
clause unconscionable, inter alia, because the financial institution did not
provide consumers with a copy of the procedural rules followed by the
entity which administered the arbitration at the time the agreement was
signed. The rules were not sent until ITT initiated a claim against the
consumer. As an alternative to unconscionability, the court might have
ruled that a consumer could not knowingly and intelligently waive the right
to a judicial forum without information about those rules at the signing of
the arbitration contract.
Under certain circumstances, a consumer may be able to successfully
argue that a waiver is invalid because it is not voluntary. Credit and other
financial services are a necessity for many persons. 326 To the extent most
financial institutions require arbitration, the consumer will lack a
meaningful choice and will be forced to waive the right to a judicial forum.
The contract rule requiring some degree of definiteness also may be
used to the advantage of the consumer challenging arbitration contracts. One
court, for example, has required the arbitration contract to be definite
enough so parties have some idea as to what matters may be submitted to
arbitration. 327 As seen above, 328 some banks use dragnet clauses which
purport to cover all disputes, past, present and future, as well as all disputes
involving the bank and its consumer, whether or not related to the
underlying transaction accompanying the arbitration agreement. Such a
324 Be11, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209. C. Howard v. Bank S., 433 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. CL
App. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994) (guarantor could not have
knowingly and voluntarily waived right to jury trial in written guaranty because he had no

way to anticipate future claim).
32518 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App. 1993).
3 26

PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION

SocIETY, THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 42 (1977).
327 Wood-Hopkins Contracting Co. v. C.H. Barco Contracting Co., 301 So. 2d 479,

480 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
328 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
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clause is designed to cover unrelated claims, such as slip and fall cases. 329 A
consumer could argue that an arbitration contract lacks the requisite
definiteness if it fails to describe with some particularity the types of
disputes which are covered by the dragnet clause. This will pose a problem
for banks seeking to draft arbitration contracts which will sustain a
challenge on this basis. If the bank drafts a clause which lists all the
possible types of claims a consumer might bring, one of two things may
happen. First, the consumer may refuse to agree to arbitrate. Second, even
if the consumer does agree, if a dispute arises which is not listed, it
probably will be construed not to be included even if the contract includes
general all-inclusive language in addition to the list.
A consumer may also attack an arbitration contract providing for
arbitration in distant forums. As discussed above, at least one court has
found such a clause unconscionable. 330 Outside the arbitration context,
courts have found distant forum provisions unconscionable. 33' In a case
which did not involve arbitration, the Supreme Court has upheld a distant
forum provision. 332 The Court pointed out, however, that the plaintiff
conceded that she received adequate notice of the contract provision
providing for all disputes to be litigated in the distant forum. Moreover, the
Court acknowledged that not all distant forum provisions would pass the
requirement of fundamental fairness. For example, the clause would not be
upheld if the drafter of the clause inserted it in bad faith or obtained the
other party's consent through fraud or overreaching measures.
Subsequently, a distant forum challenge was brought before the California
Court of Appeal in a case in which the plaintiffs did not concede they had
received adequate notice. 333 The court remanded the case for a
determination of whether the plaintiffs had received adequate notice of the
distant forum provision before entering into their contracts. As the
Patterson case illustrates 334 distant forum provisions may be present and
subject to attack in arbitration contracts involving consumers and financial
institutions.
At least one court has struck down an insurance company's arbitration
clause on public policy grounds. In Worldwide Insurance Group v.

329

J.F. Morrow & James R. Butler, Arbitration Working in Banking, I AM. ARB. REP.

No. 2 (1990), reprintedin ADR FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, at 59.
330
See supra text accompanying notes 280-87. See generally Wineland v. Marketex
Int'l, Inc., 627 P.2d 967 (Wash. App. 1981).
331 RoSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 289, at 615.
332 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
333 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1991).
334 Patterson v. FIT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal.Rptr. 2d 563 (Ct. App. 1993).
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335

the contract provided that if the arbitration award exceeded the
state financial responsibility limits, the award could be appealed by either
party for a judicial trial de novo. On the other hand, if the award was below
the state limits, the award was not appealable. The court pointed out that the
only party who would want to take advantage of the appeal provision would
be the insurance company. Consequently, the provision merely provided an
"escape hatch" for the insurance company and therefore violated public
policy. 336 The one-sided nature of the contract in Worlwide may be
comparable to the bank arbitration contracts examined above in which
provisional remedies are excepted from arbitration. 337 The only party likely
to have the opportunity to avail itself of this provision is the bank.
Finally, bank arbitration contracts may be subject to challenge in those
states which have "plain language" statutes. For example, New York law
requires every contract in a consumer transaction to be "[wiritten in a clear
and coherent manner using words with common and every day meanings;
[and] [a]ppropriately divided and captioned by its various sections."338 In
1993, Pennsylvania enacted a plain language law which excludes documents
used by financial institutions. 339 While this evidently excludes banks, the
law may nevertheless apply to finance companies and mortgage
companies. 340 The boilerplate language employed by many banks 34 1 may
fail to comply with these requirements.
Presumably, financial institutions will learn how to draft arbitration
contracts which will sustain legal challenges brought by consumers against
them. They will draft contracts in plain language or will prepare
accompanying brochures which clearly and comprehensively explain the
arbitration procedure and compare the advantages and disadvantages of
arbitration and adjudication. They will draft contracts which evenly balance
the rights and obligations of both parties and avoid provisions which seem
to give the institutions an advantage, such as distant forum clauses. They
will develop, perhaps in conjunction with the AAA, procedural rules
designed specifically for consumer disputes and will establish panels of
Klopp,

335 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992).
336 Id at 791.

337 See supra text accompanying note 64.
338 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-702 (McKinney 1989). See also N.J. REv. STAT.
56:12-2 (1989).
339 Plain Language Consumer Contract Act, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2201-2212 (1993).
340 The Act exempts documents used by financial institutions subject to examination or
supervision by federal or state regulatory authorities. Id. § 3(b)(5). See Leonard A. Bernstein,
Avoiding PractitionerPifoalls Under the New Pennsylvania 'Plain Language' Law, 64 PA.
BAR A. Q. 215, 215 (1993).
341 See supra text accompanying note 85.
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arbitrators specially trained to deal with these types of disputes. Even if
financial institutions are able to accomplish all of this, however, the
question remains whether arbitration is an appropriate mechanism to deal
with consumer disputes.
V.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER

DisPuTEs

WITH

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

This section explores the issue of -whether arbitration of consumer
disputes with financial institutions is appropriate in the sense of whether it
is wise social and legal policy. The legality of arbitration of these disputes
is assumed, even if the consumer's claim is based on a federal statute
providing for suit in a state or federal district court. 34 2 If a bank's
arbitration contract is drafted so as to withstand the challenges discussed in
Part IV, it is quite certain the Supreme Court will look favorably upon the
arbitrability of any type of dispute pursuant to the contract, unless Congress
has clearly stated otherwise. 34 3 The effectiveness of arbitration is assumed:
it is assumed that for the most part34 4 arbitration of these disputes can be
done in a prompt, inexpensive 34 5 manner. 34 6 This section asks whether,
even if legal and effective, arbitration of these disputes represents a public
policy which should be encouraged and promoted.
A. Characteristics of Disputes Between FinancialInstitutions and
Consumers
In order to determine whether arbitration is appropriate for consumer
disputes, it is necessary to ascertain what types of disputes would be
brought to arbitration. It is probably a safe assumption that the primary
basis for a financial institution's grievance against a consumer is the failure
to pay; in other words, most suits would be collection cases. 34 7 One may
342 E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1988).
343 Cf. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); see generally
Speidel, supra note 276.

344 But see infra text accompanying note 356. Arbitration may not be efficient in cases
involving documents.
345 But see infra text accompanying note 367-68.
346 See Speidel, supra note 276, at 162 (distinction between inappropriate and effective

arbitration).
347 See Golann, supra note 272, at 1092. Banks would have other types of claims such

as against consumers who violate their security agreements far less frequently (see JONATHAN
SHELDON &ROBERT A. SABLE, REPOSSESSIONS (1988)) and consumers who fail to return their
safe deposit keys when their lease expires.
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wonder why a financial institution would want to resort to arbitration to
collect a debt, for state collection law provides summary procedures
facilitating judgment and procedures to enforce that judgment.3" 8 The
procedure is especially efficient because many consumers never file an
answer or appear at the hearing, resulting in a default judgment.3 9
Arbitration might be slower and more expensive. Moreover, if the
consumer refused to comply with the arbitrator's award, the institution
would have to go to court anyway. Nevertheless, institutions may
reasonably decide the benefits of foreclosing lender liability lawsuits which
may involve class actions and punitive damages is worth the cost of
bringing collection suits to arbitration.
In stark contrast, the consumer has a wide variety of potential actions
against financial institutions. In all likelihood, these claims would be
brought as the arbitration equivalent to counterclaims or defenses in reaction
to an action brought by the institution. For purposes of evaluating the
appropriateness of arbitration to these actions, it is useful to categorize them
as: (1) disputes in which the consumer's claims are grounded largely on
common law rules; and (2) claims based on consumer protection statutes.
1. Claims Based on Common Law Concepts
Consumers can be expected to bring to arbitration claims based on
alleged fraud, duress, unconscionability, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of contract. Cases based on these types of claims are typically fact
intensive and based on common law concepts. At first blush these cases
appear to be ideally suited for arbitration. Arbitration originated to a
substantial extent as a method of resolving fact based disputes among
merchants. 350 Consumer disputes based on the above claims seem to be a
first cousin to those for which arbitration was designed. Arbitrators are
trained to resolve factual disagreements, and those chosen for consumer
cases can be expected to be familiar with common law principles and rules.
Moreover, as a general rule, arbitrators are not required to follow the law
351
unless the arbitration agreement specifically requires them to do so.
352
Rather, they are required merely to follow their own notions of fairness
348 Golann, supra note 272, at 1092.
349 MICHAEL GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACrIONS 616 (2d ed. 1991).
35 0
MacNeil, supra note 122, at 44. William Cantron Jones, Three Centuries of
CormercialArbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 207, 21314.
351 University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132 (Alaska 1974). Contra
Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418 (Mich. 1982).
352 University of Alaska, 522 P.2d at 1140.
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and justice. 353 Doctrines such as good faith and unconscionability are
largely equitable in nature354 and therefore suitable even for an arbitrator
who decides based on fairness and justice rather than a strict reading of the
law. These cases tend not to be appropriate for class action treatment if they
are fact intensive because differences in the facts from transaction to
transaction preclude a finding of common
questions of fact, which is a
55
prerequisite to class action treatment.
Nevertheless, even these types of consumer claims may be
inappropriate for arbitration. For example, arbitration's restrictions on
discovery may make it impossible for consumers to prepare their case. Even
in a case based on alleged fraudulent representations made by employees of
a financial institution, a consumer may well need documents in the
possession of the institution in order to prove the case. For instance,
documents may be necessary to prove a relationship between the institution
and the consumer, and to prove statements at odds with the institution's oral
representations. The institution's training manuals may be crucial to the
consumer's fraud case. Even if the bank provided the consumer with copies
of crucial documents, the consumer may need discovery to obtain those
documents within a meaningful time before the hearing because the
consumer's copies may be illegible.3 56 Even if the arbitrator orders the bank
to make these documents available before the hearing, the arbitrator is
unlikely to order depositions which may be crucial to the consumer's
preparation of the case.
One element of an unconscionability claim often is that the price
charged for a banking service is excessive. 357 Arbitration's severe discovery
restrictions would make it impossible to engage in the discovery of financial
data related to the bank's actual costs, overhead expenses, and profit
margins, which are needed for the consumer to prevail.
As described above, 358 some banks employ dragnet clauses which
purport to cover any and all consumer claims of whatever nature, including
tort claims such as slip and fall cases. These may be appropriate for
arbitration to the extent they are merely routine tort cases. Increasingly,
however, banks are facing claims of responsibility for the customer's safety
35 3

Metropolitan Waste Control Comm. v. City of Minnetonka, 242 N.W.2d 830, 832

(Minn. 1976).
354 RSMAR1N & SHELDON, supra note 289, at 609 (unconscionability). See Robert S.
Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201-07 (1968).
355

see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

356 Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank, 812 F. Supp. 875 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
357 Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985).
358 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
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in new situations, such as when they use automated teller machines. 35 The

state of the law is unclear, 360 and some jurisdictions have enacted their own
regulations specifically tailored to meet this problem. 361 It is questionable
whether it is appropriate for arbitrators to decide disputes involving novel,
developing, and emerging areas of the law such as these.
Even some legal standards which have their origin in the common law
may be inappropriate for arbitration. For example, the concepts of good
faith and ordinary care which apply to negotiable instrument transactions
may sound time-worn and well understood. In actuality, the official
definitions and applications of these concepts in Articles 3 and 4 of the
UCC were recently revised and represent significant departures from the
former UCC. 362 This new statutory definition needs case law development
to give parties to these transactions guidance in applying these concepts to
various fact patterns.
Another example involves an area of lender liability, about which
bankers are particularly concerned. 363 Fiduciary doctrine has a venerable
common law history. 364 Nevertheless, the case law has struggled with
inconclusive results to determine how to apply the doctrine to consumer
transactions with creditors. 365 If all of these cases are decided in private
arbitration, the case law will come to a sudden stop before it has adequately
evolved.
These cases also may be inappropriate for arbitration because of their
private nature. Absent arbitration, a consumer complains to state and federal
consumer protection agencies and files lawsuits. Filing lawsuits is precluded
by arbitration agreements. A consumer is most likely to complain to
government agencies, not primarily to inform the agencies of alleged
wrongdoing, but in an effort to persuade the agency to help resolve the
consumer's individual problem in conjunction with pending or contemplated
litigation. It is reasonable to expect that if forced to resolve disputes solely
by arbitration in which government agencies are excluded, the consumer
will not bother to inform government agencies of the dispute being resolved
by arbitration. The prohibition against lawsuits and the disincentive to
359 David Teitelbaum, Violent Crime atATMs, 45 Bus. LAw. 1967 (1990).
360 id.
361 Matt Barthel, Lawmakers Playing Politics with ATMs?, AM. BANKER, June 1, 1994,

at 14. Matt Barthel, Nation Following New York's Lead on Safety at ATMs, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 20, 1992, at 3.
362 Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Consumer Perspective,42 ALA. L. Ray. 679 (1991).
363 See supra text accompanying notes 5-14.
364 Budnitz, supra note 7, at 299-301.
365 Id. at 301-19.
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complain to agencies deprive those agencies of the data they need in order
to identify patterns and practices. The lack of such data severely impinges
upon their ability to take appropriate enforcement and regulatory actions.
The privacy of arbitration has another detrimental effect in terms of
consumer protection. In the real world, there are severe limits on the ability
of individual lawsuits and government actions to protect the general public.
The publicity generated by a verdict of fraud or similar behavior serves to
alert the consumer of practices or institutions of which to be wary.
Although arbitration proceedings are private, the consumer who receives a
favorable award from an arbitrator is not prevented from discussing it with
the press. 366 However, because arbitrators are not required to submit written
decisions and are not required to provide any reasons for their awards, the
most that a successful consumer can report to the press is an award of X
dollars. This lacks the force of specific findings of fact and rulings of law
which accompany judicial proceedings. Moreover, most consumers
probably lack the sophistication and aggressiveness needed to persuade the
press to publish stories.
One of the purported advantages of arbitration is its relative
inexpensiveness. Whether this holds true for consumer arbitration depends
upon the nature of the case. As discussed above, 367 a creditor can resolve its
collection case more cheaply by going to court. A consumer's case based on
breach of contract and involving a small amount of damages can be resolved
for less cost by bringing an action in small claims court. 368 Consequently,
arbitration is inappropriate in these cases because one of the principal
benefits of arbitration cannot be achieved.
2. Claims Based on ConsumerProtection Statutes
In contrast to consumer claims based largely on the common law
theories are claims based on violation of consumer protection statutes. The
369
statutes upon which consumers may rely include Truth in Lending Act,
37
0
371
Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
Fair Credit Billing Act,
Electronic
372
373
Funds Transfer Act, state Small Loan Acts, and Unfair and Deceptive
366 Golann, supra note 272, at 1093.
3 67

See supra text accompanying notes 345-46.

368 Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 220, 225-26 (Cal. 1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting).
In arbitration, costs are usually split between the parties. ROSMARIN & SHELDoN, supra note

289, at 570.
369 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665b (1982).
370 1& §§ 1691-1691 f.
371 Id. §§ 1666-1666j.
372Id. §§ 1693-1693r.
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Acts and Practices. It is inappropriate for this type of claim to be decided by
arbitration as it is currently constituted.
Typically the consumer's claims are based on allegations centered on
documents such as the contract, disclosure forms, perhaps a security
agreement, and perhaps a signature card. Some or all of the documents
which the consumer needs may be in the possession of the financial
institution.3 74 Obtaining these may be difficult due to the limited discovery
permitted in arbitration. 375 Generally, the parties in arbitration are limited
to subpoenas duces tecum. These may be inadequate for several reasons.
First, the consumer may not be able to identify all of the documents needed
at the outset. Only after seeing a set of documents may the consumer realize
what other documents are necessary. The subpoena duces tecum merely
requires the opposing party to bring certain documents to the arbitration
hearing. If the consumer studies those documents and requests additional
documents, the arbitrator may be loathe to grant the consumer's request
because that will require rescheduling the hearing which is contrary to the
goals of arbitration to limit discovery and eliminate the delays of
adjudication. Second, a case involving claims such as usury or
miscalculation of the Annual Percentage Rate under Truth in Lending Act
may involve analyzing complex documents and performing complicated
calculations. There is no way a consumer and attorney can properly prepare
based on the subpoenaed documents unless the arbitrator grants a recess,
resulting in further delay. A consumer alleging violation of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and needing documentation from the bank from which he
or she can prove discrimination under the "effects test" would have an
especially difficult time if burdened by arbitration's discovery
restrictions. 376 Third, arbitration does not include adjudication procedures
which simplify the trial of a document case. These include discovery in
which documents are obtained and studied a meaningful time prior to the
trial and requests for admissions including admissions of the genuineness of
377
documents.
In addition to the problems posed by limited discovery, it may be
373

KEvIN W. BROWN & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, USURY AND CONSUMER CREDIT

REGULATION 30-35 (1987).

374 Many consumers do not maintain adequate records. RICHARD L. ABEL, THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 296 (Richard

L. Abel ed., 1982).
375 See supra notes text acompaning 140-42.
376 See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (discussion of
data needed for consumer to prove credit discrimination based on zip code criterion used by

creditor).
3 77

See FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
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difficult to find qualified persons to sit as arbitrators of claims based on
these statutes, especially outside large urban areas. 378 These are very
difficult cases. First, the subject matter is complex. A simple loan
transaction may involve principal, interest charges, points or various other
front-end charges, and fees of many types including recording fees,
appraisal fees, and late fees. In a typical case involving claims of usury as
well as Truth in Lending Act violations, the arbitrator will have to know
state usury law, which may vary depending upon whether the loan is
covered by the state's retail installment act, motor vehicle retail installment
act, or small loan act. The Truth in Lending Act has its own concepts in
which the finance charge is altogether different from the interest rate. In
addition, the statutes themselves often are only the starting point. State
credit laws frequently are supplemented by state banking regulations. The
federal statutes are supplemented by regulations and official commentary,
both of which change periodically.
State statutes outlawing unfair and deceptive acts or practices on the
surface appear similar to common-law fraud doctrine which would not pose
problems for an arbitrator lacking expertise in consumer protection law.
Furthermore, because of their apparent similarity to fraud, these statutes
may not seem to raise public policy concerns. Although cases raising claims
under these statutes, like fraud cases, often are fact intensive, unlike fraud
cases, they are based on statutory law, state unfair and deceptive acts and
practices (UDAP) statutes, not the common law. Most importantly, the
objective of UDAP statutes is to offer an alternative specifically drafted to
provide the consumer with far more protection than common law fraud.
Applying the law correctly requires an expert in the field. These statutes
typically incorporate the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 79 Even the FTC
380
has had tremendous difficulty defining and applying their own Act.
378 A GAO study found that the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) did not necessarily give top priority to expertise in

selecting persons to arbitrate disputes under their jurisdiction. Markey Says GAO Report Finds
Flaws in Arbitrationof Discrimaination Cases, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 509, 510 (April 8,

1994). In apparent acknowledgement of their arbitrators' lack of competence, in January,
1994, the NASD began a mandatory training program, resulting in a drastic drop in the

number of qualified arbitrators pending arbitrators' fulfillment of this requirement. NASD
Proposal ForLarge Arbitrations Would Let PartiesDecide Panel's Pay, 25 See. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1662, 1663 (Dec. 10, 1993). See generally Constantine N. Katsoris, Should
McMahonBe Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1113, 1129-31 (1993).
379

JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPrVE Acrs AND PRACrICES 90 (3d ed.

1991).
380 See, e.g., In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984); Patricia P.
Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: the Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U. L.
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Because the arbitrator is not required to follow the law, however, the
arbitrator may instead apply unconscionability or good faith concepts or
even fraud concepts on the assumption that they are similar. Even if the
arbitrator awards damages to the consumer based on a finding that the bank
engaged in unfair or deceptive practices, he or she may disregard the UDAP
381
provisions which in certain instances award the consumer treble damages
and attorney's fees. 382 Because it is lawful for the arbitrator to ignore the
state's UDAP statute, the question arises whether it is appropriate for banks
to be able to avoid the legislature's decision to protect the consumer by
means of this law.
Lacking sufficient expertise, the arbitrator may try to apply the law
anyway. The arbitrator's task will be made more difficult as arbitration is
used increasingly, resulting in less case law to provide guidance on how to
decide cases pursuant to these laws. There is no way to know whether
arbitrators lacking expertise who try to apply the law will reach results far
astray from those intended by the legislature.
In the alternative, arbitrators may simply ignore the law and
nevertheless have their awards sustained on appeal. There are many cases
holding that arbitrators are not required to follow the law. 383 Instead, these
384 and
cases allow arbitrators to follow their own notions of fairness
justice.3 85 The case law is not uniform, however. In Wilko v. Swan, 386 the
Supreme Court stated that the arbitrator could not act in "manifest
disregard" of the law. 387 In Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth,388 the Court strongly supported arbitration, but stated that
arbitrators should decide in accordance with statutory law.389 Some state
390
courts under the UAA have adopted the manifest disregard standard.
391
Others have rejected it.
Assuming the arbitrator is sitting in a jurisdiction where he or she is
allowed to follow individual notions of fairness and justice, the question
arises whether it is possible to do so when the consumer alleges violations
RV. 849 (1984).
381 SHELDON, supra note 379, at 422.
382 Id.at 442-43.
383 See supra text accompanying notes 243-64.
384 See supra text accompanying note 241.
385 See supra text accompanying note 242.
386 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
387 Id. at 436.

388 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
389 Id.at 628.
390 See Batten v. Howell, 389 S.E.2d 170 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).

391 See Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 331 N.W.2d 418 (Mich. 1982).
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of these statutes. For example, how can an arbitrator decide a Truth in
Lending Act case on the basis of fairness or justice? This complex
regulatory scheme mandates certain disclosures. The Act and regulations
represent a carefully tailored regulatory scheme which tries to balance the
consumer's need for disclosure of certain information against the creditor's
need for clear rules and protection from unwarranted liability. 392 When a
consumer bases a case on the Truth in Lending Act, the only question
before the decision maker should be whether or not the statute has been
violated.
Even if it were possible to decide a Truth in Lending Act or comparable
case on the basis of fairness or justice, it would be inappropriate to do so.
Consumer protection statutes impose requirements upon creditors. This is
" 393
clearly indicated by the many provisions phrased in terms of "shall.
This is in contrast to other statutes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), which provide default rules. 394 The UCC, for example, states that
as a general rule, its provisions may be varied by agreement unless the UCC
specifically provides that they cannot be varied. 395 Many sections of the
396
UCC emphasize this point by using the phrase "unless otherwise agreed"
or "unless otherwise provided in the instrument." 397 Consumer protection

statutes do not permit the parties to "opt out." Arbitration agreements,
nevertheless, enable the financial institution to accomplish this in the
context of a contract of adhesion where one party is far more powerful than
the other, and it is questionable whether the weaker party realizes that
agreeing to arbitration has the effect of waiving his or her consumer
protection rights.
Moreover, as Professor Sterk has noted, "an agreement to arbitrate
should not be enforced when the statute or case law principle at issue has
aims other than promoting justice between the parties."398 Where a statute
392 JOHN SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW, CASES AND MATERLALS 106.07 (2d ed.

1991).
393 See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 15 U.S.C. § 1605a (1982) (determination of finance
charge); Credit Billing, id. § 1666c (prompt crediting of payments); Consumer Leases, id. §
1667a (1982) (required disclosures); Consumer Credit Reporting, id. § 1681e (maintenance of
specified procedures); Equal Credit Opportunity, id. § 1691 (declaring certain discrimination

unlawful).
394 1 am indebted to Professor Michael Greenfield of Washington University School of
Law for pointing out this distinction.

395 U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
396 E.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-210(2), 2-307, 3-203, 8-316, 9-112, 9-207(2).
397 E.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-107, 3-112.

398 Stewart S. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the
Public Policy Defense, 2 CARaozo L. Rnv. 481, 486 (1981).
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was enacted to promote objectives other than justice, the legislature's
intention should not be undermined by allowing an arbitrator to decide cases
on that basis. For example, one of the goals of Truth in Lending Act was to
deal with the problem faced by creditors and consumers who were subject to
widely disparate state credit disclosure laws. Congress believed uniform
disclosure rules would ameliorate this problem. 399 It would be inappropriate
in any given case for an arbitrator to ignore this federal policy of uniformity
and instead to substitute his or her belief as to what was fair to the parties in
the instant case. Furthermore, no matter how much 'expertise arbitrators
have, they do not have the wisdom to substitute their feelings for the
combined wisdom of entities such as Congress and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, who have many years of experience
deciding what national policy should be on credit disclosure.
Finally, even if it were feasible to establish an adequate pool of neutral,
thoroughly trained arbitrators who could correctly apply the various statutes
relied on by consumers, consumers would still be denied the protection
guaranteed by Congress. 400 This is because arbitration limits discovery, has
no procedure for dealing with class actions, does not require written
opinions containing findings of fact and rulings of law, and contains no
mechanism for transmitting data to regulatory and enforcement agencies.
B. Systemic Deficiencies of Arbitrationof Consumer Disputes with
FinancialInstitutions
In light of the types of claims consumers likely will make and the
consumer protection statutes which are involved when their disputes are
forced into an arbitration forum, it is fitting to question the movement to
arbitration of these controversies. Looking back at the origins of modern
commercial arbitration provides insights into the current controversy. As
related by Professor Auerbach, in the early 20th century the business
community favored arbitration and the lawyers opposed it because they
feared they would be shut out of the process. 40 As Professor Shell has
noted, "[tihe debate over the role of law was really a dispute over the role
of lawyers. "402 Arbitration by the AAA was established once the lawyers'
concerns were calmed by ensuring them a meaningful role. But this was not
399 GREENFIELD, supra note 349, at 167.
400 This discussion assumes the arbitrators would enforce laws such as the Truth in
Lending Act's provisions for statutory damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1640.
401 j.AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 5 (1983).
402 G. Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L. J. 397, 418 (1988).
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a victory for the rule of law. As we have seen, courts generally hold that
arbitrators are not required to follow the law, and the lack of written
opinions would make enforcement of a rule requiring them to follow the
law impossible as a practical matter. To understand why this approach
developed, one must look at the nature of commercial arbitration which is
the type of arbitration at the core of modem arbitration and which
40 3
influenced the approach taken by the courts.
The model of arbitration that gained acceptance in the 1920s involved

primarily resolution of disputes between members of an industry. In such
cases, all parties are members of the community that established the
arbitration process and all are likely to know and accept the norms and
customs that govern the industry. There is no pressing need for legal
accountability when the parties share a strong set of legally acceptable
values and seek to use arbitration as a means of preserving and enhancing
4°4
their relationship.

Professor Shell contrasts the model of commercial arbitration with its
shared norms to securities industry arbitration in which investors sue their
brokers. In the latter instance, there is a dispute "between an industry and
'outsiders' pursuant to standard form contracts... [in which] arbitration is
being imposed by an industry on another interest group that knows little of
the industry's form of arbitration and understands less of the industry's
5
Customs. "4

0

Arbitration between financial institutions and consumers bears a strong
resemblance to Shell's characterization of arbitration between brokers and
investors. Like securities arbitration, it is not accurate to view this as
arbitration between an individual financial institution and an individual
consumer who happened to have agreed to arbitrate their disputes. Rather,
as we have seen,406 this is a carefully planned strategy by influential
members of the financial services industry to resolve lender liability and
other claims made by consumers as a group.
Professor Shell also points out that the federal securities laws enacted in
403 AUERBACH, supra note 401, at 101-02.
404 Shell, supra note 402, at 418 (emphasis in original). See Richard Danzig, A
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621

(1975). Merchants' commercial law disputes are often resolved in private forums. Merchants'
relationships usually involve several transactions over a period of time. Commercial law's
"primary rules derive from a sense of fairness widespread - if imprecisely defined within the
commercial community." Id. at 622-23.

405 Shell, supra note 402, at 418-19 (emphasis in original).
406 See supra text accompanying notes 3, 32-39.
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the 1930s are "interest group statutes. . . intended to address perceived
imbalances between an industry that had failed to protect the public's
welfare and the public itself."407 Consequently, "[a]rbitrators deciding such
statutory claims are being asked to assume a role in the public regulation of
an industry." 40 8 As we have seen, 40 9 consumer claims generally fall into
two categories. One set of claims involves common law doctrines. The
other set involves statutory claims where state legislatures and Congress
have sought to protect consumers as a group because of the failure of
common law doctrines to provide that protection. In addition, the
legislatures have granted authority to government agencies to regulate and
enforce these statutes. As in securities arbitration, to force these disputes
into arbitration has the effect of delegating to arbitrators the role of an
industry regulator.
Along with these similarities, there are three major differences between
securities arbitration and bank-consumer arbitration, two of which lend
support to critics of arbitration in bank-consumer disputes. First, investors
generally are more sophisticated than many consumers. People who deal
with brokers have discretionary income which generally means they have
higher incomes and better education than the general public. Consumers
deal with banks and other financial institutions because they offer essential
services. In fact, as banks increase their outreach with low-cost, no-frills
basic banking services as a result of legislative mandate410 or voluntary
practice, their customer base will include persons of ever more modest
means. The lower level of sophistication of consumers coupled with the use
of standard form contracts likely means consumers understand arbitration
less than investors.
Another major difference between securities arbitration and consumer
arbitration with financial institutions is the lack of government oversight in
the former. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,4 n the Court
justified its holding in part by pointing out that the S.E.C. carefully
supervised securities arbitration. No supervisory agency412has this role in
regard to consumer arbitration with financial institutions.
The third difference between securities arbitration and consumer
407 Shell, supra note 402, at 419.
408 id.
409 See supra part V.A.
410 RUBIN, supra note 311, at 216 n.18.
411 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
412 There are signs that securities arbitration is not working as well as expected. The
NASD has urged parties to use mediation, rather than relying exclusively on arbitration. Dave
Pettit, NASD, Awash in Arbitration Cases, Urges Investors to Turn to Mediation, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 30, 1993, at B4A.
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arbitration cuts the other way by ameliorating the negative impact which
arbitration may have on consumers. Although arbitration contracts are
universal for margin and option accounts in the securities industry, 4 13 they

are far from being so in the financial services industry. Consequently,
consumers still have a viable option: they can take their business to a
financial institution which does not require arbitration. This option is
subject to two significant qualifications, however. First, unless consumers
are provided with an adequate description of the advantages and
disadvantages of both litigation and arbitration, they cannot fully appreciate
the need to consider finding a financial institution which does not require
arbitration. As described above, 4 14 most arbitration contracts do not provide
such a description. Second, it is likely that in the future, financial
institutions increasingly will require arbitration, leaving the consumer with
no choice but to accept arbitration or stop doing business with financial
institutions altogether. This absence of alternatives is especially possible in
rural or low income areas where few financial institutions may provide
services.
The above discussion suggests that consumer arbitration with financial
institutions differs from the traditional model of commercial arbitration in
two principal ways. First, the role of law is important in consumer
arbitration because, unlike commercial arbitration, financial institutions and
consumers do not share the norms and customs of the industry. Because of
this lack of shared values, arbitration awards need to follow the law in order
to be legitimate in the eyes of the consumer. This is because a consumer,
not sharing the norms and customs of the industry, needs assurance the
arbitrator has an impartial basis for his or her decision. 4 15 An inevitable
concomitant to requiring the arbitrator to follow the law is to require
written decisions explaining the arbitration decision.
In a typical commercial arbitration proceeding, the parties often are
"repeat players." Consequently, there is usually little likelihood of serious
damage being done when an arbitrator ignores or incorrectly applies the law
and the result is substantially counter to what it would have been had the
arbitrator applied the law. This is "because the law of averages will insure
that a party who loses one routine arbitration out of ten that he should have
won will win one out of ten that he should have lost, and in the process he
413 Norman S. Poser, Wen ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of
Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. Rnv. 1095, 1101 (1994); see also William A. Gregory
& William J. Schneider, Securities Arbitration:A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L.
REV. 1223, 1228 (1993).
4 14
See supra text accompanying note 86-87.

415 Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. Rzv. 1, 26-27 (1987).
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4 16
will have saved a substantial amount of legal expense, as well as time."
The injustice that results from an erroneous arbitration award rendered
against a "one-shot" player such as a consumer, however, may be very

grave. 417 The amount of money involved is usually far more significant to

an individual consumer than a financial institution.
In certain types of disputes, moreover, the arbitration forum is
inimicable to our legal system even though arbitrators follow the law and
write opinions, indeed even if there is full disclosure in arbitration
contracts, a full panoply of discovery, and routine transmission of data to
enforcement agencies. Commentators examining areas of the law other than
consumer law make the distinction between public disputes and private
disputes. In a private dispute, "only the interests and behavior of the
immediate parties to the dispute are at issue."418 Because of the "localized"
nature of the dispute, the privacy of arbitration proceedings does419not
conflict with the interests of society in public decision-making forums.
In contrast, a public dispute has been defined as one involving the
enforcement of "society-wide norms." 420 These controversies involve laws
intended to protect the "public at large."421 Arbitration is an improper
method of deciding these types of controversies because the public's interest
in the laws involved in these disputes is
in enforcing the norms embodied
422
not represented in arbitration.
The case for distinguishing public from private disputes is especially
strong where the norms are in statutes which the legislature has enacted to
protect a carefully defined disadvantaged segment of the public from the
documented abuses of a specific industry. An additional element which
illustrates the public nature of the dispute is contained in statutes in which
the legislature has designated an agency of the government to promulgate
regulations. Often such an agency has other regulatory and supervisory
responsibilities over that industry. Consequently, the consumer protection
statute at issue may be an integral part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme. Indeed, the agency with regulatory authority over the institution
may examine the institution specifically to monitor compliance with the
statute. 423 Allowing an arbitrator, who is not even required to follow the
416 Nicholas J. Healy, An Introduction to the FederalArbitrat'on Act, 13 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 223, 234 (1982).
417 See generally Golann, supra note 272, at 1091.
418 Owen Fiss, Forward."The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 30 (1979).
419 Id. at 30-32.
420 Id. at 31.
421 Sterk, supra note 398, at 492.
422

Id.

423 E.g., the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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regulations, to decide a case governed by this type of statute tears at the
fabric of this regulatory scheme. Another element which may indicate the
public nature of the dispute is a statute which has social goals beyond
achieving justice among the parties. 424
The validity of this distinction between public and private disputes and
the strength of the conclusion that public disputes should not be decided by
arbitration can be tested by examining specific consumer protection statutes
which consumers may rely upon in disputes covered by arbitration
contracts. Another way to test this conclusion is to analyze the types of
issues which arise in cases claiming violations of these laws.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)425 prohibits discrimination
"with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction" on the basis of "race,
color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age," 426 or because
all or part of the consumer's income is from public assistance. 427 In addition
to being consumer protection legislation, it also is properly considered one
part of a comprehensive package of civil rights legislation 428 including the
Fair Housing Act, 429 the Community Reinvestment Act, 430 the Home
432
Mortgage Disclosure Act, 431 and the Women's Business Ownership Act.
The ECOA originally prohibited discrimination only against women. It was
adopted by Congress as a response to data collected by the National
Commission on Consumer Finance. 433 Under the ECOA, Congress
provided the consumer with a private right of action which the consumer
434
could pursue in state or federal court, as an individual or class action.
The ECOA specifically authorizes the award of punitive damages, costs,
and attorney's fees. 435 The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to
promulgate regulations 436 and has done so. 437 Administrative enforcement is
424 Sterk, supra note 398, at 483. See infra text accompanying notes 453-54.
425 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 etseq. (1982).
42 6
Id. § 1691.
427 Id. § 1691(a)(2).
428 MICHAEL GREENILD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 245 (2d ed. 1991).
429 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982).
430 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 etseq. (1982).
4 31

Id. §§ 2801 et seq.
432 Pub. L. No. 100-533, 102 Stat. 2689, 2692-93 (1988).
433 JOHN SPANOGLE & RALPH RHONER, CONSUMER LAW CASES & MATERIALS 424

(1979).
434 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982).
435

rd. See, e.g., Marine Am. State Bank v. Lincoln, 433 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1988)

(award of attorneys' fees and punitive damages).
436 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (1982).
437 Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (Nov. 20, 1985).
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delegated to various government agencies depending on the type of financial
institution involved, 438 with the Federal Trade Commission having the
authority to enforce the Act in regard to any institution not otherwise
provided for.

439

Civil rights legislation is universally regarded as embodying societal
norms, not just a means to resolve a private dispute between two
individuals. The ECOA was a specific response to a documented problem.
Government agencies examining financial institutions specifically
investigate whether the institution is complying with the ECOA. 44 0 In
addition, the Federal Reserve Board is required to report annually to
Congress on the extent to which institutions are complying with the Act. 44 1
The Act incorporates the "private attorney general" concept by encouraging
consumer lawsuits through authorization of class actions, punitive damages,
costs, and attorney's fees. Arbitration is inappropriate because it is designed
to resolve factual disputes between individuals, not to enforce national
social policy enacted specifically to protect a given disadvantaged segment
of the population against documented systematic abuse by an industry. The
privacy of arbitration conflicts with the examination and data collection
responsibilities of government agencies. The consumer's right to class
actions, punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees is not guaranteed in
arbitration.
The type of issues which typically arise in ECOA cases also
demonstrate the inappropriateness of the arbitration fornm. ECOA cases
often do not involve factual disputes, but rather questions about the
interpretation of the ECOA and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it.
Examples include who qualifies as an "applicant" under the ECOA442 and
what types of leases are subject to the ECOA. 44 3 These cases raise difficult
issues of statutory construction. In regard to the lease issue, for example,
even the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve Board cannot
agree. 444 In addition, some ECOA cases require interpretation and
application of civil rights concepts such as the "effects test."445 Even if an
arbitrator were an expert in the ECOA and civil rights law, one may wonder
about the appropriateness of having private arbitrators rather than judges
438 15 U.S.C. § 1691c (1982).

439 I. § 1691c(c) (1982).
440

RALPH C. CLONTZ, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY MANUAL 6-6 (4th ed. 1988).

441 15 U.S.C. § 1691f (1982).
442 See GERRY AZZATA, EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY Acr 30-31 (1988).
443 1d. at 25-26.

444 id.
445 Id. at 48.
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deciding civil rights issues. 446

Apart from not sharing a civil rights aspect, the Truth in Lending Act
shares many of the same attributes as the ECOA. The Act was passed by
Congress in order to correct an exhaustively documented problem in the
marketplace. 447 The consumer was in an unfairly disadvantageous position.
Credit cost disclosures were made in such confusing ways that a consumer
could not possibly determine the true cost of credit or engage in comparison
shopping which would have promoted a more competitive marketplace. 448
In addition, Congress found evidence of widespread abuse by creditors
who, for example, did not include many fees in the percentage interest rate
and who included much crucial information in tiny print drafted in
incomprehensible legal jargon. 449 Like the ECOA, the Act includes the type
of "private attorney general" provisions intended to encourage private
lawsuits in state and federal courts. 450 The Federal Reserve Board is
authorized to promulgate regulations, 451 and administrative enforcement is
452
granted to various agencies depending upon the nature of the creditor.
The Federal Reserve Board is required to file an annual report with
Congress which includes its assessment of the degree of compliance with the
Act. 453 As with the ECOA, one may question how relegating these cases to
private arbitrators comports with Congress' intent. The Truth in Lending
Act has resulted in a substantial volume of litigation. The cases focus, not
on factual disputes, but on how to interpret and apply the Act and
regulations. For example, many of the cases are concerned with the
definition of "finance charge" and how to determine what is included in that
term. 4 4 The Act has greatly confused banks. 45 5 The Federal Reserve Board
456
has attempted to ameliorate the situation by issuing Official Commentary.
446 A judge is a "public officer, paid for by public funds; chosen not by the parties but
by the public or its representatives; and empowered by the political agencies to create societywide norms... as a way,... of giving meaning to our public values." Fiss, supra note 418,

at 31.
447 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962,

1970.
448 KEEST & SARASON, supra note 178, at 25.
449 Id. at 26.
450 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982).
451 Id. § 1604. Those regulations appear in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.
452 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1982).
453 Id. § 1613.

454 KEEsT & SARASON, supra note 178, at 60-85.
455 See ROLAND E. BRANDEL ET AL., TRUTH IN LENDING:

A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE,

3-7 (2d ed. 1994).
456 Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1993).
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Nevertheless, published case law is necessary to provide guidance to banks.
Arbitration eliminates that source of guidance.
On the surface, state usury laws seem more suitable for arbitration than
the ECOA or the Truth in Lending Act. Usury laws are primarily creations
of state law, rather than federal law. 457 Some states exempt large segments
of the consumer credit industry from coverage of their usury laws. 458 Cases
alleging usury violations would seem to be quite close to regular breach of
contract cases for which arbitration is far more appropriate than ECOA or
the Truth in Lending Act. Professor Sterk, however, has made a persuasive
argument that arbitration is inappropriate for usury cases. 459 Sterk points
out that usury cases are significantly different from routine breach of
contract cases because usury statutes are designed to protect a particular
class of borrowers who are especially vulnerable to substantial abuse.
Moreover, the position of borrowers who need this protection is such that
they are likely to be "unaware or unconcerned" when they execute a loan
agreement of the significance of the rights they are waiving when they agree
to arbitrate their disputes. 460 Sterk also notes that these cases are not
appropriate for the arbitrator who is allowed to decide based on notions of
justice or fairness. Usury laws are not designed to promote these goals. To
the contrary, compliance with usury ceilings may make it impossible for a
financial institution to lend to many of the borrowers who need loans the
most. In a given case, it may be "fair" to allow the lender to violate the
usury laws if that makes it possible for the lender to be able to afford to
make a loan to a "worthy" borrower. Nevertheless, it would completely
undermine the usury laws if lenders could evade them by diverting all
consumer loan disputes to arbitrators to whom lenders could make an appeal
to fairness or justice. 461 Finally, Sterk notes that in some states a lender

who violates the usury laws is subject to criminal sanctions. That feature
lends to usury laws the aura of public law, as embodying societal norms. As
such, a strong argument can be made that arbitration of these disputes is
inappropriate.
There is a trade-off in arguing that consumer protection statutes
involving public law are inappropriate for arbitration. Arbitration ordinarily
457 See generally BROWN & KEEST, supra note 373.
458 E.g., Fleet Fin. Inc. v. Jones, 430 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 1993).
459 Sterk, supra note 398, at 523-27.
460 Id. at 526.
461 See generally Gail Elaine Papermaster, Note, Will the Courts Scherk the Little Old
Lady in Dubuque? The Impact of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver on the Individual Investor in a
Global Securities Market, 21 TIX. INT'L. L.J. 129, 138 (1985) (seeking an equitable result in
arbitration undermines goal of securities laws "to deter violations by imposing predictable
harsh penalties").
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provides easier, cheaper, and faster access to a forum that can resolve the
consumer's dispute. "Formal law... is less accessible but may be more
worth striving for... the aggrieved can demand state redress as of right
rather than depend on a paternalistic construction of what is best."462
Having access to a forum which is obligated to enforce rights provides
consumers with an institution which can empower them. 46 3 ADR is not a
grass roots movement initiated by individuals dissatisfied with the court
system. It is imposed upon them by the state or businesses. 464 Because ADR
isolates consumers, they tend to blame themselves and believe they cannot
alter the world around them. 465 Isolating disputes through ADR promotes
an individual consumer's feeling that he or she is at fault and that the
transaction happens only to that consumer and no others. 466 Individual
complainants will not be able to achieve meaningful redress unless they can
defend themselves as organized groups. 467 In contrast, arbitration isolates
the consumer, which makes collective action more difficult. Consumer
protection statutes often are the result of successful collective action on the
part of the empowered consumer. 468 It would be ironic if their efforts,
conducted in the grand tradition of the exercise of their democratic
franchise, were to come to naught at the hands of an essentially antidemocratic move to impose arbitration clauses which ignore the rights
secured by that legislation.
Another systemic deficiency of arbitration is its confidentiality. It
undermines the government enforcement and regulatory apparatus designed
to protect the consumer and ensure a fair marketplace. 469 It makes it more

difficult for a consumer to obtain information about the experiences of
462 ABEL, supra note 374, at 308 (emphasis in original).
463 Arbitration "will always reflect existing currents of power." MAcNmL, supra note
122, at ix.

464 Id.at 297.
465 Id at 290. In contrast, participants in consumer class actions directed their negative
feelings toward the defendants. Doris Van Doren et al., The Effects of a Class Action Suit on
ConsumerAttitudes, 11 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 45, 50 (1992).
466
MAcNEmt, supranote 122 at 290-91.
467Id. at 294.

468 See, e.g., Valeria Block, Concerns Linger Over Credit Report Act Reform, AM.
BANKER, June 28, 1994, at 15 (consumer activists involved in proposed revision of Fair
Credit Reporting Act); Howard Kapiloff, Activists and Bankers in New York Pushing Their
Agendas for Lower Minimum Balances, AM. BANKER, June 29, 1994, at 5 (Brooklyn Wide

Interagency Council on the Aging working to promote low cost banking legislation); Howard
Kapiloff, Mass. Banks Move to Cut Fees, Ease Rules on Checking Accounts, AM. BANKER,
June 29, 1994, at 5 (consumer activists work for low cost bank accounts).
469

See supra text accompanying notes 398, 423.
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others. This not only increases the transaction costs for a consumer who
seeks information about a financial institution, it also isolates the consumer.
Individual consumers "can't feel they are part of a larger group." 470 While
thereby weakening the consumer, the confidentiality of arbitration increases
the power of financial institutions because confidentiality allows the
financial institution to control information. "The control of information is
an important form of power in our society."471 With that control, financial
institutions can present a positive image of the company. 472 "[A] most

powerful tool of law and order is public opinion. "473
Arbitration is specially designed to resolve disputes which arise in a
certain context. Consequently, it is beneficial to the parties in that context,
but has a dysfunctional impact when torn from it and imposed upon parties
in a setting which is significantly different. It is designed for disputes
between parties with a continuing relationship who share common values
and a common understanding of the standards by which factual disputes
should be decided. 474 It is beneficial today for parties who wish to preserve
an ongoing relationship. 475 The essence of the arbitration contract is that it
is not imposed by the state. It is a contract to which both parties can agree
after negotiations which result in a contract custom tailored to meet the
needs of each party. 476 "The great beauty of arbitration... is complete
flexibility - a flexibility vastly greater than that afforded by litigation."477
Consumer arbitration contracts with financial institutions lack any
flexibility; they are adhesion contracts imposed by a powerful party upon a
relatively powerless party who has no ability to negotiate. These contracts
are entirely different from the agreements from which arbitration derives its
legitimacy. 478
These systemic deficiencies of arbitration pose a challenge for
legislatures. They must weigh many competing values and consider the
470 LAuRA NADER, No ACCESS TO LAW 67 (1980).
471 id.
4 72
4 73

Id. at 66.
id.

4 74

See supra text accompanying note 405.
475 DE SEIFE, supra note 37, § 1:02 at 3; id. § 4:02 at 40.
476 HOENIGER, supra note 139, at 1-8, 1-9. Hoeniger strongly recommends that the
parties draft provisions dealing with the following issues: what law the arbitrator must apply;
the arbitrator's authority, such as the power to award punitive damages; whether the arbitrator
can award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Id. at 6-2.
477 Id. at 1-9.
478 Arbitration is usefil" if "a(1)all parties really wish to bind themselves to use it;
(2)

the context, particularly the power relations of the parties, justifies giving effect to their
consent to be so bound." MACNEIL, supra note 122, at ix.
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contentions of different constituencies. The decisions they make will have a
significant impact on the future of consumer protection.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The preceding sections have discussed concerns in the arbitration of
disputes between financial institutions and consumers. This section sets
forth several legislative proposals for dealing with these concerns, analyzing
the benefits and drawbacks of each. The reference to the legislature in this
discussion refers to both Congress and state legislatures, unless otherwise
noted.
A. The Laissez Faire Approach: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Do
Nothing
One possible approach is for the legislature to do nothing. Inaction can
be justified on several bases. First, there is not as yet evidence that many
consumers have been seriously abused by arbitration proceedings with
financial institutions. It is better to wait until problems emerge. First,
perhaps no problems will emerge. Second, legislative solutions can best be
designed in light of the problems which do arise. With actual problems
before it, the legislature can tailor solutions which deal with whatever
abuses actually occur. Also, legislatures can avoid overbroad treatment,
addressing only those issues which need legislative tinkering. This in turn
can help consumers as well as financial institutions. For example, actual
experience may indicate the consumer has a good understanding of how
arbitration differs from litigation. Therefore, a consumer does not need a
brochure describing those differences. The consumer, who arguably is
already confused by information overload, is benefitted by not requiring
unnecessary disclosures. 479

Those favoring a free market, laissez faire approach to market
regulation also could justify doing nothing in this instance. 480 Under this
theory, if a consumer is concerned about the problems which may arise in
doing business with an institution which requires arbitration, or if the
consumer is treated in ways contrary to self-interest, the consumer will
refuse to do business with those financial institutions which require
arbitration. 48' Although individuals need the services such institutions
479 Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the
Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists

Under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L. IRv. 13, 27-30.
480 See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAw (3d ed. 1986).
481

Brice Feim, Keeping Bank Customers Out of Courts, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
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provide, there is no danger that businesses not requiring arbitration will not
be available. The free market will operate to provide such firms, because
entrepreneurs will see that some consumers prefer no arbitration and will
step in to offer that service. 482 In addition, it is not an all-or-nothing

proposition. A financial institution could offer both a service which requires
arbitration, and one which is priced somewhat higher and does not impose
that requirement.
In Carnival Cruise,483 Justice Blackmun purports to show how this
laissez faire approach actually benefits consumers. Applying his reasoning
to arbitration, one could argue that arbitration reduces the institution's costs
by its speed and reduced likelihood of class actions and punitive damages.
Arbitration clauses which include distant forum provisions discourage
consumer actions, thus contributing further to reduced operating costs. The
increased expense incurred by ever more government regulation is reduced
by arbitration because regulatory and enforcement agencies will not have the
empirical data supplied by litigation to justify new action on their part. All
of this is good for the consumer because the institution can pass those
savings on to the consumer. 484 Furthermore, it will pass the savings on
because this will help it compete for consumer business.
Consumer advocates can be expected to oppose the laissez faire
approach, making the following responses. 485 They believe it is wrong to
wait until there is sufficient evidence of consumer suffering. While the
laissez faire proponents deal with consumers in the aggregate as an
economic unit, the consumer advocates focus on the individuals who will be
deprived of remedies to which they are legally entitled and the resulting
hardship to these persons. They are concerned with those most likely not to
realize the impact arbitration may have on them: the poor, the uneducated,
and the unsophisticated. The consumer advocates feel their concerns are
justified by the strategy thus far adopted by financial institutions. For
example, financial institutions have made no effort to explain to consumers
the benefits and drawbacks of arbitration. The arbitration "agreements"
seem designed to ensnare consumers who will not realize they are agreeing
to anything at all. This is done by including the arbitration contracts as
stuffers with the monthly statements rather than requiring the consumer's
signature on a separate document properly introduced and explained. The
inclusion of dragnet clauses illustrates that the bank's strategy seems to be
to win consumer acquiescence absent consumers understanding what they
Sept. 25, 1992, at 7.
482 Fein, supra note 481, at 7.
483 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
48 Fein, supra note 481, at 7.
485 See generally ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 289, at 569-70.
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are agreeing to.
Consumer advocates are reluctant to wait until they, government
agencies, or legislative committees have documented substantial abuses
involving many consumers and financial institutions. First, most consumers
do not complain. 486 Second, it is always uncertain how much evidence will
be necessary to attract the attention of the legislature. Even if overwhelming
evidence is gathered, in any given year, a legislature may be preoccupied
with other matters such as a budget deficit. Once the legislature turns its
attention to the need for legislation, there probably will be a substantial time
lag before any legislation will pass. The consumer financial services lobby
is certain to oppose strong measures. In addition, the legislature will have
several alternative approaches to consider, as discussed below.48 7 Finally, it

is better to act now, while consumer arbitration with financial institutions is
in its formative stages. If legislatures postpone action until adequate
documentation of actual consumer harm is available, many more financial
institutions probably will have adopted arbitration, drafted contracts, and
instituted procedures. If legislation subsequently is proposed, these
institutions will complain about the cost and disruption new laws will cause.
The economic theory espoused by the free market proponents is
justified only if the market is truly competitive and the consumer has
adequate information.4 88 This does not require all consumers to possess
adequate information, but only numbers sufficient to ififluence the market
by the action they take in response to that information. The consumer
advocates question the competitiveness of the market. Two factors support
their skepticism. First, the trend is toward far fewer financial institutions,
which likely will lead to less competition. 489 This is occurring as a result of
the failure of vast numbers of banks and savings and loans, the repeal of
many state restrictions on interstate banking, and the resulting mergers and
buyouts of many banks. 490 Financial institutions are least likely to compete
for the business of those on the bottom rungs of the socioeconomic ladder
who are least likely to be able to protect themselves. Lacking strong
486 Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to UnsatisfactoryPurchases:
a Survey of PerceivingDefects, Voicing Complaints, and ObtainingRedress, 11 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 701 (1977).
487
See infra parts VI. B, C, & D.
488 POSNER, supra note 480; NADER, supra note 470, at 70.
489 Cy Bill Atkinson, Start-Up Plan Triggers Feud in lTny Georgia Town, AM.
BANKER, May 24, 1994, at 6 (the two existing banks in town fight to keep out a third). "Mr.

Miller was so angry about the possibility of having another competitor that he made a rare
request for a public hearing before the banking department." Id.
490 Kenneth Cline et al., The Interstate Banking Game: Who Gets Eaten?, AM. BANKER,

May 25, 1994, at 4.
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competition, it is unlikely the cost savings realized by arbitration would be
passed on to consumers.
Consumer advocates also question whether sufficient numbers of
consumers will be able to obtain adequate information about the advantages
and disadvantages of arbitration.4 91 It is unlikely that any consumer
protection institution presently on the scene has the resources to launch a
sustained consumer education campaign on this issue. In addition, even if
these institutions oppose arbitration in principle, they have many other
priorities competing for their limited resources. Furthermore, any
informational campaign would have to counter efforts by financial
institutions and arbitration organizations which can be expected to promote
arbitration. Finally, a consumer information campaign would have to
counter the institution's efforts to gain consumer approval without a
consumer realizing exactly what is being agreed to (dragnet clauses), if
anything at all (stuffers in mailings not requiring signature).
The consumer advocates believe an adequate bank of information
presently exists to justify and allow legislatures to properly design a
statutory response. This information bank is based on the arbitration
contracts presently in use, 492 the experience of working with consumer
protection laws, 493 the responses several states have already taken, 494 and
495
the experience with arbitration in general.
Finally, the consumer advocates decry the impact arbitration has on the
comprehensive scheme of consumer protection laws which have been
enacted. It deprives the consumer of the laws which their elected
representatives passed for the consumer's benefit. It deprives the system of
case law which is needed to interpret and apply consumer protection statutes
in those transactions not covered by arbitration, and deprives regulatory and
enforcement agencies of needed data.
B. The Consumer ProtectionApproach: Minimum Standards
Several alternatives are available to those who reject the laissez faire
approach. These include distinguishing the level of protection required
according to the type of claim made by a consumer with a dispute.
Alternatively, a legislature could prohibit arbitration altogether for all or
certain types of claims. Regardless of the approach taken, this section
491 Patricia Sturtevant & Dwight Golann, Face-Off: Should Binding Arbitration Clauses
Be Prohibitedin Consumer Contracts?, 1 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 4, 4 (Summer 1994).
492 See infra part H1. A.
493 See infra parts IV. and V.
494 See supra text accompanying notes 268-71.
495 See infra parts M. C & D.
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proposes that if a legislature decides to amend its laws to protect consumers
from the adverse consequences of arbitration, a statute should contain the
following standards, as an absolute minimum.
The very essence of arbitration is that it is a voluntary agreement
between two parties. Given the disparity of power and knowledge between
consumers and financial institutions, the often necessitous circumstances
under which a consumer seeks financial services, and the potentially allencompassing scope of the arbitration contract, legislation should require
that a consumer is not bound unless the arbitration
contract is signed.
496
Several states already impose this requirement.
The legislature should consider whether or not to impose format
requirements on the contract. Examples include: requiring the contract to be
on a separate page from any other contract, requiring the contract to be
written in plain language, and requiring the contract to be printed in at least
ten point type. An alternative approach is to delegate to a government
agency the task of issuing format guidelines. Examples of appropriate
agencies are the Federal Trade Commission or Federal Reserve Board on
the federal level, and departments of consumer affairs and consumer
protection divisions of offices of the Attorney General on the state level.
Financial institutions may object that this will impose tremendous
administrative and cost burdens upon them. They will argue that the burden
will be especially severe in regard to current customers. The institution will
have to mail a contract to each customer. They will have to monitor every
customer account to determine if that customer has returned a properly
signed contract. In addition, because some consumers will not return the
contract, either because they object to it or just'do not get around to mailing
it back, the institution will have two categories of customers to deal with:
those whose disputes are subject to arbitration, and those whose disputes are
not. Unless substantial numbers of consumers return signed contracts, it
may not be feasible to implement an arbitration program. If an arbitration
program is implemented, the institution will have to be careful, when a
dispute arises, not to try to impose arbitration upon a customer who has not
signed the agreement. The institution's problem is less severe in regard to
new customers. They will be presented with an arbitration contract at the
time they are signing up for the institution's services, and probably will
sign the arbitration contract with the same lack of attention they are paying
to the numerous other forms they are signing. It would be easy to keep a
record of those few new customers who refuse to sign the contract.
Requiring financial institutions to obtain customer signatures on
arbitration contracts raises issues related to persons who do not sign these
agreements. The preceding discussion assumes that a current customer
496 See supra text accompanying note 270.
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cannot be denied service due to the failure to sign. That customer agreed to
purchase services at a stated price, and the institution should not be able to
unilaterally impose a modification which fundamentally alters the
agreement. 497 The position of a new customer may be more precarious. If
the consumer refuses to sign the arbitration contract, can the financial
institution refuse to provide services? At first glance, it appears refusal is a
legitimate course of action. The problem arises in the situation of a
customer needing essential banking services, living and working in a
community where there are very few banks which all require a new
customer to sign arbitration agreements. Under these circumstances the
waiver of the judicial forum is not voluntary. The legislature may wish to
require banks to serve a new customer under those circumstances, even
where arbitration contracts are not signed.
Every consumer should receive a brochure accompanying the
arbitration contract. Without a brochure explaining the consequences of
signing the agreement, a consumer cannot intelligently and knowingly
waive his or her right to access to the judicial process. 498 At least one bank,
Zions First National Bank, has voluntarily produced a brochure. 499 It
describes the arbitration procedure and points out the benefits of arbitration.
Unfortunately, it does not compare the advantages and disadvantages of
both arbitration and litigation. Legislatures should take into account the
failure of all other financial institutions to meaningfully inform their
customers what is being agreed to as well as the deficiencies in the material
produced by the one bank which decided to provide information. In light of
this conduct, legislatures should consider mandating that financial
institutions must provide a brochure describing the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration as compared to litigation. 500 Institutions faced
497 Under certain circumstances, courts have struck down creditors' unilateral change in
contract terms, even when the agreement with the customer authorized unilateral
modifications. See, e.g., Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987); Lester v.
Resort Camplands Int'l, Inc., 605 A.2d 550 (Conn. Ct. App. 1992); In re Orkin
Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263 (1986), aff'd 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989).
498 See supra text accompanying notes 322-24. Patricia Sturdevant, the attorney who
has brought the major court challenges to consumer-bank arbitration clauses, does not oppose
arbitration outright. As with sex, she says, "It's o.k. between consenting adults." Karen
Donovan, Bound to Arbitradon?Bank Trial to Decide, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at 1.
499 ZIONS FIRST NAT'L BANK, supra note 87.

500 Michigan requires that patients be provided a brochure when they sign arbitration
contracts in regard to their malpractice claims. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5041(6)
(1987). Failure to provide the brochure renders the arbitration contract unenforceable. Roberts
v. McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
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with such legislation may want to defer to a neutral body such as the
American Arbitration Association, asking them to draft a brochure. Another
alternative is for the legislation to include a list of what topics such a
brochure must discuss. Legislatures may prefer instead to delegate that task
to an appropriate agency.
A third minimum standard should be legislation which prohibits clauses
providing for hearings in distant forums. 50 1 Because of limited consumer
resources and relatively small amounts involved in most consumer suits, the
expense and inconvenience of arbitration hearings great distances from a
consumer residence effectively precludes the consumer from exercising
contractual rights to arbitrate. Some states already protect citizens from this
abuse. Florida courts have held that a contract which provides for
arbitration in another state is not enforceable under the Florida Arbitration
Code, and the provision can be voided by either party. 502 Michigan has
enacted a narrowly drawn statute which gives distant forum protection to
5 03
franchisees.
Fourth, the legislation should limit the costs of arbitration to the
consumer. Arbitration can be more expensive than litigation because
typically each party shares the cost of the arbitrator. 504 A financial
institution could easily make arbitration infeasible to a consumer by
requiring use of an arbitration organization whose filing and arbitrator fees
are excessive in relation to the amount of the consumer's claim or the
consumer's resources. Legislation restricting costs would not unduly burden
consumer arbitration. The American Arbitration Association, for example,
imposes modest costs and has a procedure for accommodating low income
505
parties.
Fifth, legislation should require financial institutions to forward the
results of arbitrations to a central repository. This information would serve
as a data base for regulatory and enforcement agencies. The information
also should be open to the public so every consumer and the media can
monitor consumer arbitration and spot institutions to avoid. The securities
50 6
industry has established such a system.
501 The drafters of the FAA did not intend to subject parties to an inconvenient forum
and believed they had obviated the problem by requiring personal service. MAcNEIL, supra
note 121, at 95, 98.
502 Damora v. Stresscon Int'l, Inc., 324 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1976); see Donmoor, Inc.
v. Sturtevant, 449 So.2d 869, 870 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984).
503 See supra text accompanying notes 218-20.

504 ROSMAMIN & SHELDON, supra note 289, at 370.
505 See supra note 111.
506 Susan Antilla, N.A.S.D. Is Expanding Information on Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1993, at 32. Investors to Have Access to More Information on Brokers, ATLANTA CONST.,
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The minimum standards legislation proposed in this part would be
appropriate both for Congress and state legislatures because they affect
arbitration under both the FAA and state arbitration statutes. One problem,
however, can be solved only by Congress. As discussed above,50 7 decisions
of the Supreme Court have made unclear the power of states to prohibit the
arbitration of disputes arising out of certain types of transactions. Congress
should amend the FAA to permit states to do so, at least in consumer
transactions. Usury statutes and statutes regulating unfair and deceptive acts
and practices illustrate the wisdom of such an amendment. The wide variety
of state legislative approaches to these areas5 °8 indicate there is no national
consensus on the best way to regulate them. This lack of uniformity may
reflect differences in the political power of interest groups from state to
state, or may reflect different prevailing local norms, economic conditions,
degree of urbanization, whether a few major financial institutions dominate
the market, and so forth. To the extent Congress has felt a need for federal
legislation, it has enacted it, for the most part leaving the states the
authority to legislate in areas not covered. s0 9 Congress should make it clear
that it does not intend the FAA to take from state legislatures the authority
to exempt consumer transactions from arbitration.
C. The Consumer Protection Approach: Alternative I Safeguards On 7ype Of Claim

Base

As discussed above,5 10 consumer claims can be differentiated based on
the type of claim the consumer alleges. Some cases are based on common
law theories such as fraud, good faith, unconscionability, and breach of
contract. Others are based on state and federal consumer protection statutes.
As discussed, the former are similar to commercial arbitration and less
infused with public policy implications. Therefore, legislatures may feel
consumers need fewer safeguards when disputes based on these claims go to
arbitration.
In regard to consumer claims based on common law theories, in
addition to the minimum standards discussed above, 511 a consumer may
need more liberal discovery rules in order to prove each case.5 12 Banks will

June 22, 1993, at C7.
507 See supra text accompanying notes 191-200.
508 See BROWN & KEEST, supra note 373; SHELDON, supra note 379.
509
KEEST & SARASON, supra note 178, at 208.
510 See supra part V. Al.
511 See supra part Vl. B.
512 Severe restrictions on discovery were reasonable for the simple transactions for
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oppose this, arguing that such departures from traditional arbitration
procedure destroy its benefits. New Jersey's Alternative Procedure for
Dispute Resolution Act, 513 however, represents a measured compromise
which retains most of the advantages of arbitration while permitting
depositions and the inspection and copying of documents. Interrogatories
514
are permitted when authorized by the decisionmaker, called an "umpire."
Discovery must be completed within 60 days, but the umpire can extend
that time and can limit or terminate discovery. The umpire's discovery
decisions are subject to appeal. Legislatures may want to adopt these
discovery rules for all consumer cases based on common law claims.
In regard to consumer claims based on consumer protection statutes,
legislatures should consider two alternatives. One option is to prohibit
arbitration altogether. 515 This is consistent with the laws of several states
which exempt consumer cases from their arbitration statutes. 516 As
discussed above, 5 17 there is a strong rationale for this approach. Arbitration
procedures are ill-suited for resolving these disputes, substantial consumer
rights and remedies are by-passed, and case law development is stifled.
Arbitration ignores the legislature's overall regulatory and enforcement
scheme, to balance the interests of consumers and financial institutions.
Arbitration eviscerates the judiciary's role in interpreting and applying
statutes with major public policy implications.
The second alternative is to allow arbitration of disputes in which the
consumer's claims are based on consumer protection statutes, but to require
substantial safeguards. One of the chief complaints about arbitration of
claims based on consumer protection laws is the arbitrator's freedom to
ignore those laws, flouting the legislature's will and depriving the consumer
of rights. This objection could be solved by requiring the arbitrator to
follow the law. This is not a revolutionary concept. The New Jersey
Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act requires that the umpire
decide the case "in accordance with applicable principles of substantive

which arbitration was originally designed. HOENIGER, supra note 140, at 8-6.
513 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-1 et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1993). See generally John V.

O'Hare, The New Jersey Alternative Procedurefor Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a
Better Way?, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1723 (1988).
5 14
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-10 (1962).
5 15

DANIEL A. EDELMAN,

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER Dispurms,

NATIONAL CONSUMER RIGHTS LITIGATION CONFERENCE 54, 67 (1994) (proposing legislation
providing that federal and state claims which provide a penalty or statutory damages would
not be subject to arbitration).
5 16
See supra text accompanying notes 268-71.
517 See supra part V. B.
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law. "518 The arbitration rules of the Center for Public Resources "clearly
contemplate a 'legal' award rather than a broad, unfettered exercise of
equitable discretion."519 The only way to know if the arbitrator followed
the law is to require a "reasoned" decision which includes findings of fact
and determinations of law. The New Jersey law provides for this type of
award. 520 Reasoned awards are the norm in international commercial
arbitration and arbitration administered by the Society of Maritime
Arbitrators521 and are required by the arbitration rules of the Center for
Public Resources. 522 Because of the breadth and complexity of consumer
protection statutes, legislation also should require a training program in
consumer protection for arbitrators. It makes no sense to require the
arbitrator to follow the law if there is no assurance the arbitrator is familiar
with it.
The legislature should consider whether to allow judicial review of an
arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator did not correctly apply
the applicable law. New Jersey permits this. 523 Financial institutions can be
expected to oppose it, arguing that judicial review on that basis obliterates
one of arbitration's chief advantages for them. Courts may balk as well,
because judges see arbitration as a means of reducing dockets. 524 Consumer
advocates will argue that judicial review is the only method by which a
consumer can be assured that arbitration awards do indeed preserve
consumer rights. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that the number of
actual appeals would be very small since the typical consumer does not
518 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12 (1962). The American Arbitration Association is
considering adopting this rule in employment discrimination cases. Arbitration Group May
Change Rules for Job Bias Cases, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Aug. 2, 1994, at 2D.
519 HOENIOER, supra note 140, at 6-48.
520 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12 (1962).
521 HOENIGER, supra note 140, at 6-51.
522 Id. at 6-48.
523 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-13(c)(5) (1962).
524 There has been considerable disagreement about the extent to which there has been a
litigation "explosion" requiring drastic measures, and the sources and reasons for current
docket levels. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: Wzat We Know

and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983). Arbitrating consumer-bank disputes may not have a
substantial impact on court caseloads. A recent study conducted by the University of
Wisconsin and RAND Institute for Civil Justice found that the largest category of lawsuits
filed in federal court involved contract disputes between Fortune 1000 companies. The next
largest categories were personal injury cases and product liability lawsuits. Who's Suing
Whom? This May Surprise, 3 Bus. L. TODAY 52 (May/June 1994).
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complain when dissatisfied. 525
A legislature that wishes to prevent arbitration from obliterating the
public policy objectives of consumer protection statutes must consider what
remedies to preserve in arbitration. Consumer protection statutes typically
authorize the court to award a successful consumer costs and attorney's fees
and provide for minimum statutory damages. 52 6 This recognizes that the

consumer acts as a private attorney general promoting the common good
when the consumer successfully brings actions under these statutes, and it is
therefore appropriate to provide incentives to encourage such actions. The
incentives are necessary due to the fact that the amount of money often
involved in these cases, while very significant to the average consumer, is
not enough to justify these actions. This feature is especially crucial to
preserve in arbitration where the consumer's share of the arbitrator's fee
may make arbitration more expensive for the consumer than litigation.
Punitive damages are important to deter companies from engaging in
outrageous conduct. Consumer advocates therefore argue that legislation
should provide the arbitrator with the authority to award punitive damages
in appropriate cases. 527 Class actions are sometimes a highly efficient way
to correct violations of consumer protection statutes, especially where the
violation is a defect in standard form contracts which affect every consumer
who signed those contracts. Therefore, consumer advocates argue the
arbitrator should have the
authority to treat the case as a class action where
528
appropriate and feasible.
Financial institutions likely would oppose the above proposals,
contending that they incorporate so much of the elements of litigation in the
judicial forum that they lose the benefits of arbitration. Consumer advocates
would counter that without these safeguards, consumers stand to lose the
rights these laws guarantee them. In addition, these laws are part of the
legislature's overall financial institution regulatory scheme. These laws help
not only the consumer, but also the business community because they
prohibit conduct which allows a firm engaging in socially undesirable
conduct to gain an unfair advantage over firms which do not. Consumer
advocates also could point out that even with the above safeguards
incorporated into arbitration, it is nevertheless advantageous to financial
institutions compared to litigation. For example, cases would be heard and
decided more quickly because the arbitrator does not have to compete with a
criminal court docket. Even if discovery is allowed to the extent proposed
here, it is more limited than discovery in a court case. Arbitrators do not
525 Best & Andreasen, supra note 486.

526 E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982).
527 Sturdevant & Golann, supra note 491, at 5.
528 Id.
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adhere to strict rules of evidence, so both sides can more easily present their
proof and argue their positions. Financial institutions would still be able to
determine the scope of disputes covered by arbitration, whether to follow
the AAA's procedures or other procedures on selection of arbitrators and
many other items. In other words, even with the suggested safeguards, the
financial institution remains in the driver's seat to a large extent, unlike its
position in the judicial forum.
Finally, the legislature should consider requiring that arbitration in
cases involving consumer protection statutes be nonbinding. 529 There is
ample precedent for this approach. Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, sellers are authorized to establish informal dispute resolution
mechanisms. If the mechanisms are consistent with FTC rules, a consumer
must submit the dispute to the nonbinding mechanism before filing a
complaint in court. 530 If consumer arbitration of disputes with financial
institutions was nonbinding, the legislature would not be as concerned about
the need to incorporate litigation safeguards into arbitration. Judge Wayne
Brazil who oversees an ADR program in a federal court, suggests that if
arbitration is a sound alternative to litigation, financial institutions should
have enough confidence in it to support a nonbinding procedure. In
addition, nonbinding arbitration would increase the legitimacy of this
method of dispute resolution in the eyes of a consumer. 531 Financial
institutions can be expected to oppose this proposal, contending that
nonbinding arbitration lacks the finality which is one of arbitration's main
benefits. Past experience suggests, however, that few consumers would
have the stamina to pursue a complaint in the courts even if dissatisfied with
the results of arbitration. 532 Moreover, binding arbitration may not result in
529 Sturdevant & Golann, supra note 491, at 5. See Comments of Gail Hillebrand,
Litigation Counsel, West Coast Regional Office of Consumer Union, in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Roundtable, THE RECORDER 10 (Spring 1993) ("If nonbinding, I think I would
agree that they [arbitration clauses] are of benefit."). But see Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
590 N.E. 2d 1242 (Ohio 1992) (nonbinding arbitration is an oxymoron; contract providing for
such arbitration is unenforceable).
530 Rosmarin & Sheldon, supra note 289, at 500.
531 Obviously my strong preference is for nonbinding circumstances....

And if

the proponents of the service have enough confidence in its rationality and its
fairness to say, 'Look. We'll go through this with you. If you don't like what
happens, then you have your right to the Seventh Amendment.' If the proponents
say that, they can encourage respect for them and the process they want their
people to use, both as a political and philosophic matter.
Alternative DisputeResolution: A Roundtable, supra note 529, at 14.
532 Best & Andreasen, supra note 486.
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meaningful finality. Its confidential awards have no precedential or
widespread effect; consequently, others with the same problem will have to
seek redress. While there may be finality to resolution of the individual
consumer's case, there is no finality in terms of resolving the underlying
problem which will give rise to many subsequent cases. 533 Financial
institutions also may oppose this proposal based on the fear that those who
do go to court after nonbinding arbitration will be precisely those for whom
the institutions most want binding arbitration: consumers with class action
claims or those seeking punitive damages or both. Nevertheless, legislatures
may find nonbinding arbitration an attractive solution because it preserves
traditional arbitration while providing access to the judicial forum.
D. Consumer Protection Approach: Alternative II Board Rules To Govern ConsumerDisputes

Across The

The proposal discussed above sets up a two-tiered system, with one set
of arbitration rules for cases where the consumer's claims are based on
common law theories and another set of stricter rules for those cases based
on consumer protection statutes. Even if one agrees legislatures should
adopt laws to safeguard the consumer in arbitration, one can question the
advisability of this two-tiered system. In such a system, the consumer will
be tempted to make claims based on consumer protection statutes in order to
gain the advantages of the attendant safeguards. The financial institution and
consumer consequently will become engaged at the outset in a battle over
whether the consumer has a legitimate basis for making that type of claim.
Furthermore, some might argue that a claim based on a common law cause
of action such as fraud may be far more significant to the public interest
than one based on a technical violation of a disclosure requirement in a
consumer credit statute.
For these reasons, the legislature should consider an alternative
approach. If the legislature does not wish to make distinctioris between
types of claims, the legislature could instead treat all claims alike. The
legislature that wants to protect the consumer in arbitration could simply
provide that arbitration of consumer disputes is prohibited. This solution
eliminates any confusion. It eliminates any need for the legislature to decide
what types of safeguards to incorporate into arbitration.
On the other hand, the legislature may want to preserve the arbitration
option while treating all consumer arbitration alike. This could be done by
retaining consumer arbitration but building in some or all of the safeguards
533 "Private nonlitigative methods of resolving disputes may 'give the appearance of
resolving some disputes while avoiding a finding of more extensive liability or leaving
fundamental issues unsettled.'"Guill & Slavin, supra note 221, at 12.
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suggested above. How many and which safeguards is a function of how
serious the legislature is about preserving consumer rights. As in most
human endeavors, every benefit to one group may result in a cost to another
group. Every consumer safeguard built into arbitration makes arbitration
somewhat less "efficient" for financial institutions. On the other hand,
allowing financial institutions to avoid judicial forums by means of adhesion
contracts when their actions violate statutes which specifically provide
consumers with those forums is a serious deprivation of consumer rights
and an evisceration of legislative purpose.
VII. CONCLUSION
Legislatures must decide whether they wish to seriously protect
consumers. If they do, they must modify arbitration law so its effect is not
to eviscerate consumer protection. Richard Abel has described the essential
difference between formal justice, which is the traditional judicial system,
and informal justice, which includes arbitration and other types of ADR.
Informal justice institutions "neutralize conflict. " 53 They do so by
providing easy access to a resolution forum, isolating the individual
complainant, and resolving the dispute in a quick and inexpensive manner.
Informal justice, however, does nothing to solve the underlying problem
which is the cause of many consumer complaints. This is because ADR's
focus is on "process not outcome. 535 ADR deals with disputes in a way
that does not "challenge basic structures. 536 Professor Abel characterizes

ADR as "antinormative"because ADR does not try to change behavior or
act in a judgmental manner. 537 In other words, ADR is a band-aid. Formal
justice, in contrast, has the capacity to meaningfully deal with and solve
underlying problems which give rise to complaints. 538 The state and federal
legislatures have done their part by enacting a comprehensive body of
consumer protection laws, designed, not merely to resolve consumer
disputes, but also to provide meaningful remedies to serious market failure.
The problems those laws were designed to combat cannot be solved,
however, unless they can be enforced through the courts. Therefore, unless
the legislatures wish their legislative efforts to come to naught, they will
have to adopt at least some of the proposals discussed herein.

534 ABEL, supra note 373, at 284.

535 Id. at 294 (emphasis in original).
536 Id.at 283.
537 Id. at 290.
5 38
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